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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BANK
REGULATORY REFORM: THE
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
SAFETY AND CONSUMER
CHOICE ACT OF 1991
MICHAEL KLAUSNER*
The basic structure of the bank regulatory system has changed little in
close to sixty years. The system was put in place in 1933 in response to
widespread bank failures during the Great Depression. At a fundamen-
tal level, the system was designed to wall off banks from market forces.
Only banks could take deposits, make loans, and pay checks. Within this
preserve, banks were protected from competition from the outside. Se-
curities firms, which in the past had engaged in banking as well, were
barred from the banking business. Later, other types of firms that
threatened to enter the banks' preserve were kept out by new legislation.
Banks also were protected from competition from within their preserve.
They were prohibited from paying interest on transaction accounts, the
rates they paid on time and savings deposits were subject to a ceiling set
by the Federal Reserve Board, and all deposits under a specified amount
were guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Competition to make loans was limited by state and federal bank regula-
tors, who rationed bank charters, and by a system of state and federal
laws that forced banks to operate within narrow geographic areas. In
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short, the model of banking contemplated was one in which a bank held
some amount of monopoly or oligopoly power over a local banking mar-
ket. In exchange for this power, banks were required to remain within
their preserve. Their freedom to engage, either directly or through affili-
ates, in businesses other than the business of banking was narrowly
circumscribed.
For almost fifty years, the banking industry thrived under this arrange-
ment. Banks were profitable and, in contrast to the 1920s and early
1930s, very few failed. Although many factors contributed to the stabil-
ity of the banking industry during this period-including a relatively sta-
ble economy-the protective regulatory structure was an important force
in promoting stability. The price society paid for this stability was the
inefficiency that generally accompanies monopoly, including wasteful
spending by banks and misallocated credit.
By 1980, the legal regime originally designed to protect the banking
industry by walling competitors out of the banks' profitable preserve had
begun instead to trap banks within a shrinking market. The legal rules
had not changed, but the market had. Through financial product inno-
vation made possible by computer and telecommunications technologies,
securities firms, mutual funds, and even commercial and industrial com-
panies had developed products and services that competed with banks'
traditional deposit and loan services. As bank customers have left the
banks in favor of these new products, legal restrictions have prevented
banks from following. As a result, competition for a shrinking banking
market has intensified, bank profitability has declined, and bank failures
have soared.
Although banks have lost their protection from competition, they re-
tain the power to offer risk-free deposits. In reliance on federal deposit
insurance, they are able to continue raising a high volume of funds. The
primary restraint on their use of those funds-and on the riskiness of the
investments they make with those funds-comes from a system of com-
mand and control regulation by state and federal bank regulatory bu-
reaucracies. The result, as evidenced by a record of accelerating bank
failures over the last decade, is increased risk-taking at the expense of the
FDIC and potentially the taxpayer.
The savings and loan industry has gone through a similar, although
much more severe dynamic, under which market forces converted a pro-
tective legal regime into a destructive regime. By the time public policy
makers caught up with the S & Ls, losses estimated at about $150 billion
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had been incurred. Congress responded to the savings and loan crisis by
enacting the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA).1 In the long run, the most important provision
of that Act may have been one that directed the Department of the
Treasury to "conduct a study of the Federal deposit insurance system."2
On February 5, 1991, in response to this congressional directive, the De-
partment of the Treasury issued a report proposing the most comprehen-
sive reform of the bank regulatory system since the current structure was
put in place.3 A month later, the reforms proposed in the Treasury Re-
port were introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives as
the "Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991
(FISCCA). ' '4
This Article analyzes the interaction between the bank regulatory sys-
tem and the market for financial services and examines the ways in which
bank regulation affected profitability and risk-taking both before and af-
ter 1980.1 The Article focuses on the range of business strategies avail-
able to banks during each period and the incentives operating on bank
shareholders and managers in selecting from available strategies. The
Article suggests that although banks have always been subject to restric-
tions in the services they may provide, before 1980 those restrictions did
not prevent banks from adopting profitable, low-risk business strategies.
Indeed, the bank regulatory system induced banks to adopt such strate-
gies. As a result of changes in financial services markets that began in
the mid-1970s, however, the profitability of legally permissible low-risk
strategies declined for many banks. The deposit insurance system's im-
plicit subsidy of risk-taking consequently became more attractive to bank
shareholders and managers than it had been in past. The Article then
suggests the type of regulatory reform that is necessary in order to allow
1. FIRREA authorized the resolution of failed thrifts, reorganized the federal agencies re-
sponsible for regulating and financing the thrift industry, amended the rules governing the operation
of thrifts and their holding companies, enhanced the banks' and thrift regulators' enforcement au-
thority and increased criminal penalties.
2. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, § 1001(a)(b), 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 103 Stat. 183, 507-08.
3. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT].
4. S.713, 102d Cong. 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S3712 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1991); H.R. 1505,
102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. H1912 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1991).
5. The use of 1980 as a dividing point is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. The forces that
transformed the economic environment of the banks began in the mid-1970s, and the incidence of
bank failures, which reflect this transformation, did not accelerate until 1982.
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banks to operate effectively in the modem market for financial services.
Finally, the article discusses the ways in which FISCCA would respond
to the need for reform.
Part I of the Article briefly examines the central features of the current
bank regulatory system and its inherent weaknesses. Part II examines
the performance of the banking system prior to 1980 and offers a concep-
tual explanation of how shareholder and manager incentives contributed
to the stability of this period. Part III then examines the instability of
the post-1980 period and extends the analysis of shareholder and mana-
gerial incentives to explain the instability of this period. Part IV briefly
identifies the types of fundamental regulatory reforms that are needed.
Finally, Part V describes and evaluates FISCCA.
I. THE 1933 REGULATORY SYSTEM
The current bank regulatory system is largely the product of the Bank-
ing Act of 1933,6 which was enacted in response to widespread bank fail-
ures between 1930 and 1933. The objective of the system was to require
banks to operate within limited product and geographic markets and to
protect banks from competitive forces in those markets. Congress rein-
forced this protection in 1956 with the Bank Holding Company Act and
again in 1970 with an amendment to that Act. Although this approach
succeeded remarkably well for over forty years, it contained the seeds of
future instability.
A. Central Elements of the Regulatory System
The primary elements of the bank regulatory system include: Restric-
tions on the financial products that banks and their affiliates may pro-
vide;7 restrictions on entry and geographic expansion;8 and restrictions
on protection of bank depositors' funds through federal deposit insur-
ance.9 An additional element, which since the early 1980s has declined
6. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
7. Banking Act of 1933, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378, 78 (1988) (often referred
to as the "Glass-Steagall Act"); Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 4, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(1988).
8. McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1988); Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 3(d), 12
U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988) (often referred to as the "Douglas Amendment" because Senator Paul H.
Douglas introduced this provision during floor debate. 102 CONG. REC. 5902 (1956)).
9. Banking Act of 1933, § 8; Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 684 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Discount window lending by the Federal Reserve is
[Vol. 69:695
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in significance, is the restriction of interest payments on deposits. In or-
der to enforce this panoply of restrictions and to limit the FDIC's expo-
sure to bank risk-taking, the system provides for extensive regulatory
supervision to maintain the "safety and soundness of banks."' 0
1. Restrictions on the Financial Services Banking Organizations May
Perform
Under current law, banks and their affiliates are subject to stringent
restrictions on the products and services they may provide. Although
the law allows banking organizations" to engage in certain nonbanking
activities subject to strict limitation, the basic model of banking reflected
in current law is one in which a bank takes deposits, makes loans, pays
checks, and performs other services that support these fundamental
banking functions. 2
Prior to 1933, a segment of the commercial banking industry was
heavily involved in underwriting securities, most commonly bonds." In
1929, commercial banks and their affiliates underwrote 45.5 percent of all
new bond issues. '4 Following the 1929 stock market crash, there was a
popular sentiment, shared by members of Congress, that banks' involve-
ment in securities markets had contributed to the crash and that banks'
another important element of the bank regulatory system. Regulation A, 12 C.F.R. § 201 (1991).
With deposit insurance available, however, its primary function is to preserve the deposit insurance
fund by preventing liquidity shortages from creating solvency problems.
10. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § l1(b), 48 Stat. 162, 181-82. The Banking Act of 1935 ex-
tended the same controls to state-chartered banks that were not members of the Federal Reserve
System. Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 702. Interest-rate controls on all ac-
counts other than domestic demand deposits were phased out beginning with the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 201-210, 94 Stat. 132,
142-45 and the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 326-
327, 96 Stat. 1469, 1500-01. See Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It Passed
Away, 68 REVIEW, Feb. 1986, at 22 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). Today businesses are not
paid interest on demand deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1988); 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (1988 & Supp. I
1989). Accounts not paying interest currently comprise approximately 17% of bank deposits. Brun-
ner, Duca, McLaughlin, Recent Developments Affecting The Profitability and Practices of Commer-
cial Banks, 77 FED. RESERVE BULL. 505 (1991).
11. The term "banking organization" refers to a bank and its affiliates.
12. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 406 (1987) (Security Pacific) (describ-
ing these activities as "core banking functions"). Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1988) (defining a branch
office of a bank as a place where "deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent").
13. Out of approximately 27,000 commercial banks in the country, however, only 459 were
underwriting securities directly and another 132 banks were doing so through affiliates. W. PEACH,
THE SECURITY AFFILIATES OF NATIONAL BANKS 83, 109 (1941).
14. Id.
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securities activities should be curtailed. The failure of forty percent of
the nation's banks over the following four years fueled this sentiment. t5
Critics accused banking organizations of having conflicts of interest be-
tween their duty to maintain sufficient assets to repay depositors and
their interest in supporting their securities affiliates. More generally,
there was a concern that risks assumed by securities affiliates were being
shifted to banks by virtue of the banks' willingness to provide financial
assistance to affiliates experiencing difficulty.16
In response to this sentiment, Congress segregated banking organiza-
tions from most aspects of the securities underwriting and dealing busi-
ness, and barred securities firms from engaging in commercial banking,
which it defined as the taking of deposits and the making of loans. Thus,
four sections of the Banking Act of 1933, known collectively as the
"Glass-Steagall Act," severely restrict banks from underwriting or deal-
ing in securities. Section 16 prohibits national banks17 from underwrit-
15. Kelly, Legislative History of the Glass-Steagall Act in DEREGULATING WALL STREET 41,
43-45 (I. Walter ed. 1985).
16. Id. at 46-47 (quoting congressional subcommittee hearings). The types of transaction that
created these concerns were the following: (1). bank purchases of securities from affiliates without
proper regard for the price paid or the risk assumed; (2) bank loans to weak securities affiliates,
presumably at rates of interest that did not reflect the risk of default; (3) bank loans to customers, on
inadequate terms, for purchases of securities from affiliates; (4) manipulation of the bank's own stock
through purchases and sales by its securities affiliate; (5) risk to the reputation of a bank as a result of
the actions of a securities affiliate; and (6) bank purchases of securities from a securities affiliate for
trust accounts. Id. Although the primary concern was that the existence of a securities affiliate
would create a risk for a bank, some of the identified concerns actually involved risk to the securities
affiliate. G. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING: THE
GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED 26 (1990). See also Flannery, An Eco-
nomic Evaluation of Bank Securities Activities Before 1933, in DEREGULATING WALL STREET,
supra note 15, at 69-71; Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88
BANKING L. J. 483, 497-515 (1971).
17. The bank regulatory regime divides banks into three categories: national banks, state banks
that are members of the Federal Reserve System (state member banks), and state banks that are not
members of the Federal Reserve System (state nonmember banks). National banks are chartered
and regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency and are automatically members of the Federal
Reserve System. State banks are chartered and regulated by state banking authorities. The existence
of state and federal chartering and regulatory authority is referred to as the "dual banking system."
State banks that choose to become members of the Federal Reserve System are regulated by the
Federal Reserve Board, and state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System are
regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the FDIC) in addition to their state regula-
tors. Finally, the Federal Reserve Board regulates the holding companies of all banks. As of June
1990, approximately thirty-three percent of insured commercial banks were national banks, eight
percent were state member banks, and fifty-nine percent were state nonmember banks. Because
national banks and state member banks are generally larger than state nonmember banks, however,
national banks, state member banks, and state nonmember banks held approximately fifty-nine per-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/4
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ing or dealing in corporate securities.18 Section 20 prohibits member
banks from having an affiliate "engaged principally in the issue, flotation,
underwriting, public sale, or distribution" of securities. 19 Section 32 pro-
hibits any director, officer, or employee of a securities underwriting firm
from holding any such position with a member bank.20 Finally, Section
21 prohibits any firm that engages in securities underwriting and dealing
from also accepting deposits. 21
The Glass-Steagall Act, however, does not prohibit all securities activi-
ties for banks and their affiliates. Banks are still permitted to underwrite
and deal in federal government debt securities and general obligation
state and municipal debt, referred to as "eligible" securities. They are
also permitted to execute orders for the purchase or sale of securities on
behalf of customers.2 2 Additionally, none of the Glass-Steagall restric-
tions applies to a U.S. bank's operations abroad.2  Finally, affiliates of
banks are permitted to underwrite and deal in a wide range of ineligible
securities, including corporate debt and equity, as long as they are not
"engaged principally" in such activities. The Federal Reserve Board has
interpreted this language to allow an affiliate of a bank, referred to as a
"Section 20" affiliate, to underwrite ineligible securities as long as the
affiliate derives no more than ten percent of its gross revenues from this
type of underwriting. 24 Only the largest banks, however, can generate a
sufficiently large base of eligible securities business and other non-de-
posit-taking business in a Section 20 affiliate to conduct a viable business
underwriting and dealing in ineligible securities without breaching the
ten percent limit.
Analysis since 1933 has raised substantial doubt regarding popular
claims that bank securities activities caused either the stock market crash
cent, seventeen percent, and twenty-four percent of bank assets, respectively. TREASURY REPORT,
supra note 3, at XVIII-8 (fig. 1).
18. 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (Seventh) (West Supp. 1991). Section 5(c) of the Banking Act of 1933
applied the restrictions of Section 16 to member banks. 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988).
19. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
20. Id. § 78.
21. Id. § 378. State nonmember banks are not subject to sections 16, 20 or 32 of the Glass-
Steagall Act. However, they are subject to section 21 and therefore cannot engage in underwriting
or dealing in securities directly. Under the statute, they can engage in those activities through an
affiliate. The FDIC, nonetheless, has prevented their affiliates from underwriting or dealing in secur-
ities. 12 C.F.R. § 337.4 (1991).
22. Banking Act of 1933, § 16, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (Seventh) (West Supp. 1991).
23. 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.5(d) (1991).
24. Banking Act of 1933, § 20, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988); Modification to Section 20 Orders, 75
FED. RESERVE BULL. 751 (1989).
1991]
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or the bank failures of the early 1930S.25 Moreover, careful review of the
legislative history of the Banking Act of 1933 has raised questions re-
garding whether Congress, at the time, had any evidence supporting
these claims.26 Nonetheless, the assumption that commercial banking
and securities underwriting do not mix has dominated popular thinking
in this area for fifty years.
The Glass-Steagall Act referred only to the securities activities of
banks and their affiliates. It thus left open the possibility that a bank
could affiliate with a firm other than a securities underwriting firm. For
example, the Act did not prevent a commercial firm from owning a bank,
nor did it prevent common ownership of a bank and an insurance under-
writing firm.27 However, the Bank Holding Act of 1956,28 as amended in
1970,29 limits the activities of a bank's affiliates to those "so closely re-
lated to banking... as to be a proper incident thereto," and authorized
the Federal Reserve Board to regulate bank holding companies. Conse-
quently, affiliates of banks are prohibited from engaging in nonbanking
activities other than those that the Federal Reserve Board determines to
be consistent with this statutory standard.
Furthermore, to the extent that a banking organization may engage in
nonbanking activities, it is subject to restrictions regarding the interac-
tion of a bank and its nonbank affiliates. The primary restrictions in-
clude statutory limits on transactions involving the transfer of funds by a
bank to an affilate30 and limits on banks' marketing of the products or
25. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1867-1960, at 305-08, 353-37 (1963); Flannery, supra note 15, at 67; Huertas, An Economic
Brief Against Glass-Steagall, 14 J. Bank Res., Autumn 1984, at 148. Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 305, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1988); Statement by Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, December 1, 1987, 74 FED. RESERVE BULL. 91,
95 (1988); ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 148 (1984); FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
MANDATE FOR CHANGE: RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INSUDTRY 36-45 (1987).
26. G. BENTSON, supra note 16, at 20-42; Kelly, supra note 15, at 43-54.
27. Savage, A History of the Bank Holding Company Movement in THE BANK HOLDING COM-
PANY MOVEMENT To 1978: A COMPENDIUM 21, 38 (Staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 1978).
28. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 4(c)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
29. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101, 84 Stat.
1760, 1760-62 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1988)). The fact that commercial firms and
banks could have become affiliates with one another until 1970 is often lost in discussions of the
"long-standing" separation of banking and commerce.
30. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988). Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act limits the aggregate vol-
ume of "covered transactions" between a bank and any affiliate to ten percent of the capital stock
and surplus of the bank. "Covered transactions" include inter alia loans to an affiliate, purchases of
[Vol. 69:695
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services of an affiliate.3 1 In addition, interaction between banks and Sec-
tion 20 affiliates are subject to especially stringent restrictions-referred
to as "firewalls" -promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board.3 2
In sum, bank regulation severely restricts banks from providing non-
banking services. These restrictions effectively prevent most banking or-
ganizations from engaging in any nonbanking activities at all and prevent
all nonbanking firms from engaging in banking activities.
2. Restrictions on Entry and Geographic Expansion
Although less severe in recent years than in the past, restrictions on
entry and geographic expansion have been a central element of this coun-
try's bank regulatory system since the nineteenth century. The law cur-
rently prohibits banks from opening branches across state lines, although
interstate expansion through bank holding company affiliates--on either
a regional or national basis-is permitted in most states. Intrastate
branching is generally unrestricted as well. New bank charters are issued
by the Comptroller of the Currency for national banks and by state bank-
ing authorities for state banks, and from the 1930s until the 1970s, both
were limited in order to restrain competition in local banking markets. 33
The National Bank Act of 1864, which established the national bank
system, is silent regarding the power of national banks to open branch
offices, as is the legislative history of the Act. Nonetheless, the Comp-
troller of the Currency ruled in 1865 that national banks could not oper-
ate through branches, and the Supreme Court adopted that
interpretation of the Act in 1924. 34
In states that allowed branching by state-chartered banks, the Comp-
securities issued by an affiliate, purchases of assets, and issuance of a guarantee on the behalf of an
affiliate. The volume of covered transactions with all affiliates in the aggregate is limited to twenty
percent of capital stock and surplus. In addition, Section 23A requires collateral of between 100%
and 130% on loans to affiliates and guarantees on behalf of affiliates. Finally, Section 23A prohibits
a bank from purchasing low-quality assests from an affiliate. Id.
31. Id. § 371c-1.
32. See J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., The Chase Manhattan Corp., Bankers Trust New York Corp.,
Citicorp, Security Pacific Corp., 75 FED. RESERVE BULL.. 192 (1989); Modifications to Section 20
Orders, supra note 24, at 751; Orders Issued Under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act: J.P.
Morgan & Co. Inc., 76 FED. RESERVE BULL. 26 (1990); Orders Issued Under Bank Holding Com-
pany Act: Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, The Royal Bank of Canada, Barclays PLC, Bar-
clays Bank PLC, 76 FED. RESERVE BULL. 158 (1990).
33. Peltzman, Entry in Commercial Banking, 8 J. L. & ECON. 11 (1965).
34. First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924). See R. ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROL-
LER AND BANK SUPERVISION: A HISTORICAL APPRAISAL 81-86, 100-05 (Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, 1968).
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troller's branching restriction placed national banks at a competitive dis-
advantage. To reduce this disadvantage, Congress passed the McFadden
Act in 1927, which granted national banks and state-member banks
branching authority within a city, town, or village to the extent that their
state bank competitors enjoyed such a privilege.35 In response to the dis-
proportionate failures of unit banks and banks with narrowly focused
branches in the early 1930s, the Banking Act of 1933 extended this
branching authority, allowing a national bank or a state-member bank to
establish branches anywhere in its home state to the same extent that a
state-chartered bank is permitted to branch under the law of that state.36
At that time, Congress considered and rejected the option of further re-
ducing branching restrictions for national banks.3 7 Thus, although
branching restrictions pre-date the Banking Act of 1933, they were delib-
erately retained as a central element of the regulatory regime created by
that Act.
Today, only two states prohibit intrastate branching, and nine other
states restrict it.3 8 As a result, throughout most of the country both state
and national banks are permitted to open in-state branches. However,
essentially no interstate branching is permitted under state law. As a
35. McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 36(c) (1988)). Historically, many states either prohibited branching or restricted it to locations
within the city or county of a bank's head office. These restrictions originated in the nineteenth
century, before which time banking was carried out primarily by single-office or "unit" banks.
Shortly after the turn of the century, and largely as a result of urbanization, economic pressure for
branch banking developed. As the growing middle class moved to the outskirts of major cities and
the center of the cities became congested with automobiles, banks began opening branches in the
areas in which their customers lived. The states' responses to branch banking varied. Some states
permitted it and others prohibited or restricted it. See SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMPEN-
DIUM OF ISSUES RELATING TO BRANCHING BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (Fischer & Golembe,
The Branch Banking Provisions of the McFadden Act as Amended: Their Rationale and Rational.
ity)(1976) [hereinafter Fischer & Golembe].
36. As amended, the McFadden Act provides that a national bank "may ... establish and
operate new branches ... at any point within the State in which [such bank] is situated, if such
establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State
in question." 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1988). The McFadden Act was intended to provide "competitive
equality" between national banks and state banks. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust, 385
U.S. 252, 261-62 (1966).
37. Fischer & Golembe, supra note 35, at 28-34. The measure considered would have allowed
interstate branching within a single trade area.
38. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at XVII-7-8. Colorado and Wyoming prohibit branch-
ing. The following states restrict branching: Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minne.
sota, Missouri, New Mexico, and Tennessee. Id.
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result, neither state nor national banks are permitted to establish branch
networks across state lines.
Bank holding companies' interstate activities are governed by a combi-
nation of state and federal law similar to that created by the McFadden
Act. Under a provision of the Bank Holding Company Act commonly
known as the "Douglas Amendment," a bank holding company that op-
erates a bank in one state may acquire a bank in another state only if the
acquisition is expressly authorized by statute in that state.3 9 Most state
statutes currently allow acquisitions by out-of-state bank holding compa-
nies, although some states limit such acquisitions to holding companies
from states within a specified region and some require reciprocity from
other states. As a result, many banking organizations currently operate
groups of affiliated banks across state lines.'
3. Deposit Insurance
Deposit insurance is the third pillar of the bank regulatory system. It
has two purposes: to protect small depositors and to prevent bank runs.
Under current law, the FDIC guarantees that if a bank becomes insol-
vent,4 the FDIC will repay the bank's depositors up to a limit that is
generally referred to as $100,000 per depositor per bank.42 In fact, how-
ever, the rules governing that limit are far more complex. Moreover, the
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988).
40. According to the TREASURY REPORT, forty-six states (all but Hawaii, Kansas, Montana,
and North Dakota) allow out-of-state holding companies to operate banks within their borders.
Twenty-one of those states allow entry from any state that offers reciprocal entry; twelve states allow
entry from any state regardless of reciprocity; and thirteen states are parties to regional reciprocity
pacts. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at XVII-8. Some of those states that allow entry require
holding companies to acquire an existing bank rather than organizing a new bank. See also Miller,
Interstate Banking in the Court, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 179 (discussion of regional bank expansion).
41. Ifa solvent bank becomes illiquid, the Federal Reserve is authorized to extend the bank a
loan.
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (Supp. 1 1989). This limit was $2,500 when deposit insurance was first
instituted in 1933. The history of the statutory limit of coverage is summarized in the following
chart:
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FDIC's current practice in "resolving"43 failed banks usually preserves
even uninsured deposits. Consequently, the present system comes very
close to insuring 100% of all deposits. Banks pay premiums at a flat
annual rate of 23 cents per $100 of domestic deposits for this
protection.44
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act provides that in applying the cov-
erage limit of $100,000, the FDIC shall combine all of a depositor's ac-
counts in an institution "maintained in the same capacity and the same
right for his benefit either in his own name or in the names of others. '45
Accordingly, the law applies separate $100,000 limits to a depositor's
individual, joint, fiduciary, and business accounts.46 In addition, the law
explicitly provides that individual retirement accounts are to be insured
separately up to $100,000. 47 A depositor thus can expand his or her in-
surance coverage within a single institution by creating separate joint
trust, retirement, and business accounts. In this manner, a family of
three is potentially able to obtain $1.2 million of coverage within a single
bank, even without a business account. Moreover, because the limit ap-
plies on a per-institution basis, a depositor can obtain even greater insur-
ance coverage by spreading funds among more than one bank.
The FDIC also has used the "same capacity" concept to extend insur-
ance coverage to institutional fiduciary accounts, such as employee pen-
Limit in
Year Limit 1990 Dollars
1933 $ 2,500 $ 29,000
1934 5,000 59,000
1950 10,000 55,000
1966 15,000 56,000
1969 20,000 66,000
1974 40,000 97,000
1980 100,000 153,000*
Present 100,000 100,000
* An additional limit of $100,000 was addzd for state and local government accounts in
1974 and for individual retirement accounts and Keogh accounts in 1978. THE FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION:
THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 69 (1984) [hereinafter THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS]. Figures in
1990 dollars are adjusted using the implicit price deflator for gross national product in THE
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 290 (1991) (Table B-3)
43. The term "resolve" is a term of art that refers to the FDIC's reorganization of a failed bank.
The term includes all alternative means of disposing of a failed bank.
44. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1817(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1991); 56 FED. REG. 21,064 (1991) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. 327.13(c)).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (Supp. 1 1989).
46. 12 C.F.R. § 330 (1991).
47. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(3) (Supp. 11989).
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sion plans and accounts in which a broker holds client funds, in amounts
up to $100,000 per beneficiary.48 This "pass through" coverage allows
pension plans and deposit brokers to hold millions of dollars in insured
deposits on behalf of beneficiaries.
Finally, in almost all bank failures, the FDIC protects uninsured de-
positors along with insured depositors. This occurs most commonly
when the FDIC chooses to resolve an insolvent bank by merging it with a
healthy bank. In this type of transaction, termed a "purchase and as-
sumption" transaction, the healthy bank acquires the assets of the failed
bank and assumes its liabilities, including its uninsured deposits. Rather
than making payments to the depositors of the failed bank, the FDIC
infuses cash into the insolvent bank to the extent necessary to attract an
acquiror.
The FDIC is authorized to use a purchase and assumption transaction
when doing so would be cheaper than paying off the insured depositors
directly and liquidating the failed bank.49 Whether this condition applies
in a particular case depends on a comparison of the amount of cash the
FDIC must pay into the failed bank and the shortfall in the proceeds the
FDIC would receive if it were to pay off the depositors and liquidate the
bank's assets.5" Because the transaction costs of liquidations are high,
and because a failed bank often has a going concern value that can com-
mand a premium from an acquiror, this comparison usually leads the
FDIC to use the purchase and assumption method of resolution rather
than an insured deposit payoff followed by a liquidation."
The FDIC also protects uninsured deposits when it determines that
,.severe financial conditions exist which threaten the stability of a signifi-
cant number of insured depository institutions or of insured depository
institutions possessing significant financial resources."52 This protection
could take the form of a purchase and assumption resolution or the infu-
sion of funds into a bank that continues to operate. 53 Beginning with its
48. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at V-3. This "pass-through" coverage extends to escrow
accounts and accounts held by other financial institutions to facilitate payments processing. Id. at
V-2.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (Supp. 1 1989).
50. Indirect costs of a liquidation could be considered as well.
51. See Bovenzi & Muldoon, Failure Resolution Methods and Policy Considerations, 3 FDIC
BANKING REV., Fall 1990, at 1; Bovenzi & Murton, Resolution Costs of Bank Failures, 1 FDIC
BANKING REV., Fall 1988, at 1.
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2)(B)(iii) (Supp. 1 1989).
53. Id. § 1823(c)(1).
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resolution of Continental Illinois National Bank in 1984, the FDIC has
announced that certain banks are "too big to fail," by which it means
that if uninsured depositors of the bank were permitted to lose their de-
posits, the financial system would sustain severe damage. In such cases,
the FDIC protects uninsured depositors.14 The FDIC has not, however,
specified how large a bank must be considered to be too big to fail.
The result of these various rules and practices is that seventy-five per-
cent of all deposits in the banking system are explicitly insured,5" and the
remaining twenty-five percent is very likely to be protected in the event
of a bank failure. Since 1985, the FDIC has protected over ninety-nine
percent of uninsured deposits of banks that have failed. 6
Three primary mechanisms control the FDIC's exposure to losses
from bank failures. First, banks are subject to a wide range of regula-
tions governing the activities in which they may engage, the loans and
other investments they may make, the management personnel they may
retain, and other aspects of their operations. Second, banks are subject to
a set of net worth, or "capital," requirements intended to ensure that a
bank's shareholders have a sufficient stake in the bank to restrain risk-
taking, and to reduce the FDIC's exposure should the bank's fortunes
decline. Finally, the FDIC and the other bank regulators have the power
to close a bank or to terminate the insurance of a bank that is insolvent,
that engages in "unsafe or unsound practices," or that is in an "unsafe or
unsound condition."
57
54. The potential systemic damage includes: 1) The inability of the failed bank to fulfill obliga-
tions under bank payment or securities clearing systems; 2) the inability of the failed bank to fulfill
check clearance obligations; 3) the loss of the failed bank's correspondent banks' deposits; and 4) the
possibility of runs being triggered at other banks. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at 111-29-35,
This rationale could lead the FDIC to protect nondepositor creditors as well. Id.
55. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 114 (1990).
56. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Robert R. Glauber, Under
Secretary of the Treasury) (as yet unpublished).
57. The legal authority of the banking agencies to close a bank is somewhat of a tangled web.
The Comptroller of the Currency has the authority to close national banks, 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1988),
and state bank regulators have the authority to close state-chartered banks. When the Comptroller
closes a bank, it is required to appoint the FDIC receiver. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. I
1989). State banking authorities are not required to appoint the FDIC receiver but they usually do,
and the FDIC is authorized to accept such appointments. Id. § 1813(c)(3). In addition, if a state
has appointed another party receiver, the FDIC may, under certain circumstances, appoint itself to
replace the state-appointed receiver. Id. § 1821(c)(4). The FDIC also has the authority to terminate
a bank's insurance if it determines that a bank has engaged in or is engaging in "unsafe or unsound
practices," or that it is in an "unsafe or unsound condition." Id. § 1818(a). Termination of insur-
ance would require closure in the case of a national bank or a state member bank, Id. § 1818(o), and
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The power of the regulators to close a failing bank in part reflects the
fact that the FDIC occupies a role similar to that of a creditor in addition
to its role as an insurer. Like an insurer, the FDIC must make payments
in respect of covered losses. The FDIC is then subrogated to the claims
of the insured depositors, and assumes the role of a creditor with a claim
against the estate of the bankrupt bank.5" The power to close a failing
bank allows the FDIC or other regulator to prevent the dissipation of the
bank's assets, just as the power of a creditor to invoke the bankruptcy
process serves to prevent dissapation of the firm's assets in the nonbank-
ing context.
B. Seeds of Instability
Each element of the bank regulatory system described above contains
both stabilizing and destabilizing potential. Deposit insurance prevents
runs, but it also subsidizes socially wasteful risk-taking, which can result
in unnecessary bank failures. The geographic restrictions, coupled with
restraints on entry, potentially protect inefficient banks from failure, but
they also prevent banks from diversifyingtheir loan portfolios across re-
gions and from achieving economies of scale. Similarly, the activity re-
strictions, coupled with restrictions on nonbanking firms providing
banking services, reduce bank's exposure to interindustry competition,
but they also prevent banks from diversifying their services and achieving
economies of scope.
1. Subsidized Risk-Taking
Shareholders of banks, like shareholders of any corporation, enjoy lim-
ited liability. They are potentially liable to creditors only to the extent of
their equity in the bank. This situation creates the possibility that a
bank, like any limited liability firm, will make investments without fully
taking into account the possibility that it will become insolvent and de-
fault on its liabilities. Outside the banking context, creditors attempt to
prevent such behavior by demanding interest rates containing risk premi-
ums that compensate for the possibility of default, and by placing cove-
nants in loan agreements that limit the freedom of borrowers to take
risks. By forcing corporations to pay for the risk of default, creditors
in almost all states, it would require the closure of a state nonmember bank as well. CONFERENCE
OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE-CHARTERED BANKING 147 (11th ed. 1986)
(listing of states that require FDIC insurance).
58 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g) (Supp. I 1989).
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ideally constrain corporations to make only those investments that carry
expected returns that compensate for the risks involved. 59 This discipli-
nary mechanism does not exist, however, in the case of depositors placing
insured funds in a bank. As long as the FDIC guarantees the repayment
of a bank's deposits, depositors are indifferent to the risk that the bank
will become insolvent and default on its deposits. The bank's sharehold-
ers thus enjoy both the limited liability normally accorded shareholders
as well as debt financing near the risk-free interest rate regardless of the
risk the bank assumes. In the absence of other restraints on risk-taking,
this arrangement will lead to socially wasteful risk-taking.
The introduction of deposit insurance has displaced insured depositors
as a source of discipline on bank risk-taking. The FDIC, together with
the other bank regulatory agencies, must therefore provide that disci-
pline. Deposit insurance premiums ought to be equivalent to the risk
premium creditors would charge to account for the possibility of default.
Unless deposit insurance is priced to take account of the risk that the
FDIC will have to make good on its obligation to depositors, a bank's
shareholders will not bear the full costs of the risks that the bank as-
sumes. Consequently, one would expect banks to assume greater risk
than they would if their shareholders were required to absorb the full
costs of their actions. In fact, under the present system, deposit insur-
ance is not priced to take account of risk. The FDIC charges banks a flat
premium rate regardless of the risk that a bank will become insolvent and
require the FDIC to make good on its commitment to depositors. Con-
sequently, deposit insurance, in effect, subsidizes banks that take risks
greater than the level of risk that happens to be reflected in the flat rate
premium, and it taxes banks that take lesser risk.
The nature of the deposit insurance subsidy is most easily demon-
strated with an example. Consider a bank with a market value net worth
of $100 that has a choice of three alternative business strategies, each
with a fifty percent probability of success: The first strategy would result
in a $100 gain if successful and a $50 loss if unsuccessful; the second
strategy would result in a $200 gain if successful and a $200 loss if unsuc-
cessful; and the third strategy would result in a $200 gain if successful
and a $500 loss if unsuccessful. For simplicity, assume that the period of
success or failure of these investments is the same, and assume a risk-free
rate of interest equal to zero.' The expected values of the projects are a
59. That is, a firm will only make investments that have a positive net present value.
60. The $100 net worth would include the market value of intangible assets such as franchise
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gain of $25, zero gain, and a loss of $150, respectively. From a societal
point of view, the bank should therefore adopt the first strategy. Its pro-
spective gains are greater than its prospective losses.
The limited liability of the bank's shareholders, however, skews their
choice of strategy. Because their liability is limited to $100 (the bank's
net worth), the loss that they would incur under either the second or
third strategies is at most $100 despite the fact that those strategies may
in fact result in greater losses. Losses greater than $100 would be borne
by the FDIC. The expected values of the three strategies to the share-
holders, therefore, are gains of $25, $50, and $50, respectively.6" Conse-
quently, the bank's shareholders would select either the second or the
third strategies.
By adopting the second or third strategy, the bank would implicitly
extract $50 or $200, respectively, from the FDIC. If the flat-rate deposit
insurance premium happens to be $50, the net subsidy to a bank adopt-
ing the third strategy would be $150 (the $200 expected value of the
future FDIC payment minus the $50 premium.), and there would be no
subsidy to a bank that adopts the second strategy. Because the deposit
insurance premium does not vary with risk, however, a bank purpose-
fully can select a strategy that is sufficiently risky to entail the extraction
of a subsidy.
Another way to view deposit insurance is as a put option on the bank's
assets with an exercise price equal to the value of the bank's liabilities.6 2
A put option is the right to sell a specified asset to another party at a
specified price referred to as the "exercise" or "strike" price on or before
a specified date. If the value of the asset falls below the exercise price,
the put can be exercised and the holder would receive a gain equal to the
value or goodwill. This type of example could be modified to take account of the duration of the
strategies and interest rates, but the analysis would remain the same. This example is a simplified
version of the state-preference model employed by Furlong and Keeley in analyzing the effect of
capital requirements on bank risk-taking. See Furlong & Keeley, Capital Regulation and Bank
Risk-Taking: A Note, 13 J. BANKING & FIN. 883 (1989).
61. In a more complicated example, the net present values of these loans would be the relevant
measure of value to both the bank shareholders and to society.
62. See Merton, An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees,
3 J. BANKING & FIN. 3, 5-11 (1977Xmore complete analysis of the factors that determine the value
of the put). For a recent attempt to measure the value of the put to sixty-three large banks, see
SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISION, REGULATION AND INSURANCE, 101ST
CONG., IsT SESS., BANKING INDUSTRY IN TURMOIL: A REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE U.S.
BANKING INDUSTRY AND THE BANK INSURANCE FUND 36-37 (Comm. Print 1990) (Barth, Brum-
baugh, & Litan). The rights of corporate shareholders are also equivalent to a put. Interest rates on
corporate debt, however, ideally force the shareholders to pay for the value of the put.
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
712 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
difference between the value of the asset at the time the option is exer-
cised and the exercise price. In the context of deposit insurance, bank
shareholders have the right to transfer both their assets and their deposit
liabilities to the FDIC if the value of the bank's assets falls below the
value of its liabilities (i.e. if the bank becomes insolvent). If that occurs,
the bank shareholders are absolved of further liability.63 In effect, there-
fore, the bank shareholders have sold the bank's assets to the FDIC for a
price equal to the value of the bank's deposits. For instance, a bank with
$1,000 of assets and $900 of deposits, in effect, has the right to transfer its
assets at any time to the FDIC, at which point the FDIC will, in effect,
pay the bank $900 by assuming its $900 of liabilities to depositors. If the
value of the bank's assets falls from $1,000 to $700, for example, the
shareholders would lose only $100 rather than $300. The FDIC would
incur the remaining loss of $200 when it pays off the bank's depositors.
Therefore, the shareholders of the bank can take risks with their assets
secure in the knowledge that, at most, they can lose $100 and that they
can keep all gains if the risks pay off.
The prospective value of the put option depends upon the degree of
risk that a bank assumes. The higher the potential losses beyond the
value of the shareholders' equity and the greater the likelihood of such
losses, the more valuable the put will be. Unless the FDIC charges a
bank for the value of the put, it will implicitly subsidize the bank. In
order to charge the correct price of the put, however, the FDIC would
have to base its premiums on the risk that the bank will fail and on the
expected magnitude of the FDIC's losses if it does fail. Again, the flat-
rate premium, in effect, allows banks to assume a level of risk higher than
the level represented by the prevailing premium rate and thereby to ex-
tract a subsidy from the FDIC.
Any insurance arrangement entails a potential wealth transfer from
the insurer to the insured similar to that described above. If the insured
does not bear the full cost of the risks it assumes, it will not take full
account of those costs when engaging in risk-taking behavior. If the in-
surer were able to monitor the insured perfectly and to determine the
riskiness of the insured's behavior on a continuous basis, the insurer
could charge the insured premiums that reflect the risk assumed, thereby
63. The presence of uninsured deposits or nondeposit liabilities would complicate the analysis,
particularly because of the ambiguity regarding the FDIC's protection of such liabilities. It would
not, however, alter its thrust or validity. For simplicity, therefore, this discussion assumes the hypo-
thetical bank has only insured deposit liabilities.
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forcing the insured to bear the full cost of its risk-taking behavior. This
level of monitoring and risk assessment, however, is not possible. As a
result, a problem of divergent interests between the insured and the in-
surer, or "moral hazard," inheres in any insurance relationship."4
Private insurers use several mechanisms to reduce moral hazard. One
mechanism is to charge premiums based on the estimated risk assumed
by the insurer, as described above. A second type of mechanism is
designed to restrain risk-taking by requiring the insured to bear some of
the risk of the insured-against loss. This type of mechanism includes
deductibles, coinsurance, and upper limits on coverage.65 Each of these
devices forces the insured to internalize some of the cost of its risk-taking
behavior. The higher the cost borne by the insured, the less risk the in-
sured will be inclined to assume. A third type of mechanism is to include
in the insurance contract a set of restrictions on the activities in which
the insured may engage. By controlling the activities of the insured, the
insurer can prevent certain foreseeably risky activities or situations.
The deposit insurance system relies on capital requirements, which are
similar to a deductible, and on activity restrictions to restrain bank risk-
taking. Insurance premiums are not related to a bank's riskiness, there is
no coinsurance, and essentially all losses are covered by the FDIC.66
Capital requirements are intended to ensure that the shareholders of a
bank have at least a minimum amount to lose if a bank fails.67 The as-
64. K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
14-15 (1986).
65. Under a deductible arrangement, the insured incurs the first $X of cost arising from an
insured-against event. Under a coinsurance arrangement, the insurer pays for a specified percentage
(less than 100%) of the losses up to a specified limit, after which point the insured bears the remain-
ing costs.
66. See White, The Reform of Federal Deposit Insurance, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 11, 17-18 (1989).
The FDIC can also terminate insurance, which is tantamount to closing a bank. Under current law,
however, the termination of insurance or closure of a bank is subject to a set of substantive and
procedural requirements that preclude the FDIC from taking action until a bank is insolvent.
Therefore, the power to terminate the insurance relationship can be used to minimize FDIC losses
once a bank becomes insolvent but not to prevent losses entirely.
67. Bank capital requirements consist of two components: a "leverage ratio" requirement and
a system of "risk-based capital guidelines." Under the leverage ratio requirement, banks must main-
tain "Tier I" capital in an amount equal to at least three percent of their assets. The three-percent
requirement, however, applies only to those banks the regulators rate as being in the best financial
condition. All other banks must have additional Tier 1 capital in an amount of one to two percent of
their assets. "Tier I" capital is defined to include common stockholders' equity, noncumulative
perpetual preferred stock and related surplus, and minority interests in the equity accounts of con-
solidated subsidiaries. Under the risk-based capital guidelines, banks must, by December 31, 1992,
maintain Tier 1 capital in an amount equal to at least four percent of there "risk-weighted assests."
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sumption underlying capital requirements is that bank managers will
take into account the potential losses of shareholders in making decisions
regarding risk (or in ignoring the need to make such decisions). The
more capital a bank has, the greater the losses shareholders will suffer in
the event of a failure. In addition, capital serves as a cushion that ab-
sorbs losses ahead of the FDIC. Therefore, for any given level of risk,
higher capital decreases FDIC losses. Capital thus performs the same
role as a deductible in an ordinary insurance relationship.6"
Under current law, however, capital is not measured by the market
values of a bank's assets and liabilities. Instead, regulators rely on banks'
balance sheets, which typically contain the values of a bank's assets and
liabilities measured according to generally accepted accounting princi-
ples (GAAP). As a result, bank assets and liabilities are generally re-
corded at historical values. A loan of $1 million made at an interest rate
of ten percent five years ago, for example, would be carried on the books
of a bank at $1 million today, even if market interest rates are now higher
than they were five years ago, and the same loan would pay twelve per-
cent today.69 Particularly in light of the volatility of interest rates since
the late 1970s, GAAP values are often an imprecise measure of a bank's
assets and liabilities. A bank with negative net worth on a market value
basis may be able to meet the capital requirements on the basis of GAAP
values. Conversely, a very profitable bank may have a higher net worth
on a market value basis than on a GAAP basis, even if it pays out a high
portion of its earnings in dividends.70
Activity restrictions include the restrictions on bank involvement in
nonbanking activities discussed above. In addition to these categorical
In addition, banks' "total capital" must equal at least eight percent of their risk-weighted assets. The
value of a bank's "risk-weighted assets" is determined by classifying the bank's assets according to a
set of categories specified by regulation, multiplying the book value of the bank's assets in each
category by a factor provided for by regulation and intended to represent the credit risk of that
category of assets, and summing these products. "Total capital" is defined as Tier I capital plus
"Tier 2" capital, which includes cummulative perpetual, long-term, and convertible preferred stock
and related surplus, perpetual debt, and hybrid debt/equity instruments, intermediate-term pre-
ferred stock and term subordinated debt (up to a limit), and loan loss reserves (up to a limit). Good-
will and other intangible assets are not included in any of the capital concepts. For the period until
December 31, 1991, a set of transition rules apply. 12 C.F.R. § 3, § 225, App. A and D, § 208, App.
A and B, and § 325 (1991).
68. See White, supra note 66, at 20-21.
69. For a more complete discussion of the distortions that arise as a result of GAAP account-
ing, see White, On Measurement of Bank Capital (Working Paper No. Ec. 91-9, Department of
Economics, Leonard N. Stem School of Business, New York University, 1991).
70. Id. See also White, supra note 66, at 19.
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restrictions, the FDIC and the other bank regulators have the power to
order a bank to alter its asset portfolio or its operations if the bank is
engaged in an "unsafe or unsound practice."71 Ideally, this allows the
regulators to keep bank risk-taking at a level commensurate with the flat-
rate premiums charged for deposit insurance. In extreme cases, the regu-
lators can close a bank deemed to be too risky. Bureaucratic supervision
as a means of controlling the risk-taking behavior of over 12,000 banks,
however, is at best an imprecise means of bringing risk into line with the
level of deposit insurance premiums.7 2 Under current practice, for exam-
ple, banks are never closed before their net worth falls substantially be-
low zero.
Consequently, banks can take risks that are borne in part by the
FDIC, which, depending on the amount paid in insurance premiums, can
amount to a subsidy of risk-taking. This deposit insurance subsidy is not
a direct payment to a risky bank; indeed, the bank never receives money
from the FDIC. Instead, the bank receives the subsidy simply by taking
sufficiently high risks that entail the possibility that it will incur losses
greater than the value of its shareholders' equity. If the risks pay off, the
shareholders keep the entire return. If the risks do not pay off and losses
are greater than the value of shareholders' equity, the FDIC will make
up the shortfall to depositors. Thus, unless insurance premiums equal
the expected value of losses greater than the bank's equity, deposit insur-
ance constitutes a subsidy. The magnitude of the deposit insurance sub-
sidy varies depending on the degree of risk a bank assumes. The higher
the potential losses beyond the value of the shareholders' equity and the
greater the likelihood of such losses, the higher the subsidy will be.7"
The existence of a deposit insurance subsidy, however, does not imply
that banks can necessarily increase their risk-adjusted returns by increas-
ing their risk. Competition among banks in a given market could lead
banks to pass the subsidy on to their customers, either through lower
interest rates on loans or higher rates on deposits. Once a high-risk loan
71. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b), (c) (Supp. I 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 337 (1991).
72. For a discussion of the bureaucratic and political impediments to effectively controlling
bank risk-taking, see E. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 7-27
(1985).
73. One way to view the subsidy is as the difference between (a) the sum of the insurance
premiums paid to the FDIC and the interest rate a bank must pay on insured deposits (which will
generally be close to the risk-free rate), and (b) the rate the bank would have to pay if the deposits
were not insured. That difference would depend upon the likelihood that the bank will become
insolvent and fail to repay the deposit.
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market becomes perfectly competitive, the risk-adjusted profitability of
entering that market would be no more than the competitive level. At
that point, a bank would be indifferent between entering the risky market
and entering a low-risk market that pays a competitive risk-adjusted re-
turn. The effect of the subsidy is to increase the relative volume of risky
loans by providing an incentive for banks to enter risky loan markets up
to the point at which they bid down the rate of return to the competitive
level. Banks that enter a risky market early earn a return above the com-
petitive level, but as entry continues, an equilibrium is reached at which
the volume of risky loans is higher than it would be without the subsidy,
but the return to the banks providing those loans is no greater than a
risk-adjusted competitive return.
From a societal point of view, the deposit insurance subsidy has four
negative effects. First, credit is misallocated away from lower-risk
projects and toward higher-risk projects. Second, credit is misallocated
to projects that on an ex ante basis are not socially beneficial-for in-
stance projects being financed under the third hypothetical strategy dis-
cussed above, the expected losses of which are greater than their expected
gains.74 The "see-through" buildings that dot the Dallas landscape are
examples of such projects. Third, the higher level of risk increases the
frequency and extent of bank failures, thereby increasing the aggregate
cost of resolving failed banks and the dislocation experienced by the cli-
ents of those banks. Finally, the deposit insurance subsidy gives the
banking industry a competitive advantage over other providers of similar
services-securities firms for example-thereby allowing the banking in-
dustry to grow at the expense of other types of financial institutions.
75
2. Lack of Diversification
A second source of instability created by the regulatory system is in-
sufficient diversification of risk. Because of geographic restrictions, many
banks' loan portfolios are concentrated on borrowers and industries in a
limited geographic region. Similarly, activity restrictions prevent banks
from reducing risk by diversifying their portfolio of services. As a result,
banks are more risky than they could be.
There are approximately 12,000 commercial banks currently chartered
in the United States, the vast majority of which serve small geographic
markets. In contrast, there are sixty-five banks in Canada, eight of which
74. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
75. See White, supra note 66, at 13-15.
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are very large and six of which operate nationwide.76 This geographic
concentration of individual banks in the U.S. leaves banks exposed to the
risk of local or regional downturns. 7 The vulnerability of small banks is
reflected in their historically high failure rates compared to larger banks.
During the 1920s, 1930s, and 1980s, small banks with few or no branches
experienced disproportionately greater rates of failure than large banks.78
The uniquely American structure of small, geographically dispersed
banks originated when population centers were separated by large dis-
tances and communication and transportation technologies limited the
efficiency of operating through branch networks.79 This structure has
remained in place, however, largely because of the legal restrictions im-
posed on branching. Deposit insurance has also helped maintain this
structure. Not only is the credit risk of small, poorly diversified banks
generally higher than that of larger banks, but their vulnerability to
runs-even when they are healthy-is greater than that of larger banks.80
As the widespread failure of small banks during the 1920s indicates,
without deposit insurance depositors are unlikely to have underwritten
the unnecessary riskiness of 12,000 small banks.8 1
76. Canada has a population of approximately one tenth that of the United States. This popu-
lation difference, however, explains only a small part of the differential between the two countries.
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at XVII-17-18. There are approximately 150 banks in Japan, 550
in the United Kingdom, and 900 in Germany. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT supra note
42, at 158 (1991).
77. See L. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT
SUPERVISION 109-11 (1991)(the effect of the Southwest economic downturn on thrifts in the region).
78. C. BREMER, AMERICAN BANK FAILURES 40-47 (1935); E. WHITE, THE REGULATION
AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEM 1900-1929, 218-20 (1983); TREASURY RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at XVII-8; Calomiris, Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective,
50 J. ECON. HISTORY 283, 291-92 (1990).
79. See R. ROBERTSON, supra note 34, at 27-29. While branch banking systems had existed in
several antebellum southern and western states, these branches generally had greater autonomy and
local control than those of modern branch systems.
80. Small banks would be even more vulnerable than their credit risk warrants. A rumor,
whether truthful or not, regarding an industry on which the bank depends could trigger a run on a
poorly diversified bank. If the bank is unable to obtain liquidity assistance, the liquidation of its
assets to meet the demands of a run could lead to insolvency. Deposit insurance, however, elimi-
nates the possibility of a run by insured depositors and allows small banks, which generally have few
uninsured depositors, to hold undiversified loan portfolios without having to account to depositors.
See Diamond & Dybvig, Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation, 59 J. Bus. 55,
58-60, 62-64 (1986).
81. The relationship between deposit insurance and the structure of the U.S. banking industry
was not lost on Congress in 1933. One option before Congress was to reduce branching restrictions
as a means of reducing bank failures. In fact, Senator Glass actively supported legislation that would
have expanded national banks' branching authority regardless of the powers granted their state-bank
competitors. Senator Glass initially opposed deposit insurance. However, in a compromise that
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Like the geographic restrictions, the activity restrictions of the Glass-
Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act impede diversification.
As a result of these restrictions, banks are vulnerable to shifts in demand
away from banking services to other financial services.8 2
These limits on the extent to which a bank may expand across geo-
graphic or service markets also constrain banks' efficiency. The geo-
graphic restrictions potentially prevent banks from exploiting economies
of scale that may exist in the provision of certain services. Similarly, the
activity restrictions prevent banks from achieving economies of scope
among financial services. As long as banks were protected from competi-
tion, the loss of these potential efficiencies may not have carried a high
social cost. Once banks began to face competition from financial institu-
tions that are not subject to these restrictions, however, the social costs
increased substantially. 3
In sum, since 1933, the structure of the bank regulatory system has
contained elements of instability. Banks have been exposed to the risks
of regional or local economic downturns and of changes in the demand
for banking services. Deposit insurance has prevented banks' misfor-
tunes from being exacerbated by a run, but it has not eliminated banks'
exposure to risk. Instead, it has shifted the burden of disciplining risk-
taking and reorganizing insolvent banks from the private sector to the
public sector. Moreover, as currently structured, deposit insurance po-
tentially subsidizes bank risk-taking, including risk-taking that is waste-
ful from a societal point of view. As demonstrated during its first forty
years of operation, however, the bank regulatory system's weaknesses did
not lead directly to actual problems.
would determine the shape of the industry for the rest of the century, if not longer, he agreed with
Congressman Steagall, Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, to support the
establishment of deposit insurance rather than interstate branching in exchange for the congress-
man's support for the activity restrictions that would become known as the Glass-Steagall Act.
Fischer & Golembe, supra note 35, at 28-34 (in 1932, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee,
which Senator Glass chaired, reported a bill that would have done this); Golembe, The Deposit
Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of Its Antecedents and Its Purposes, 75 POL. SCh Q.
181, 195-99 (1960). Preston, The Banking Act of 1933, 23 Am. ECON. REV. 585, 597 (1933).
82. Diversification across services may have saved banking organizations involved in securities
activities during the Great Depression. In many cases, their securities businesses suffered great
losses, but only one bank failed as a direct result of securities affiliate losses. Flannery, supra note
16, at 75.
83. See infra notes 154-156 and 177-179 and accompanying text (extent of potential
economies).
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II. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY BEFORE 1980
Despite the potential for instability, the 1933 to 1980 period was one of
great stability in the banking industry. One explanation for this stability
lies in the effect the regulatory system had on the financial services mar-
ket during that period.
A. Record of Stability
From 1921 through 1929, bank failures averaged 524 per year, and
from 1930 through 1933 they averaged approximately 2,275 per year.
Following the passage of the Banking Act, the incidence of failure
dropped dramatically. From 1934 through 1942, bank failures averaged
approximately 43 per year, which probably reflected unresolved
problems that originated before 1933. From 1943 through 1980, the fail-
ure rate fell to approximately five banks per year.14
This stability is attributable to several factors. First, the
macroeconomic environment during this period was conducive to bank
stability. Interest rates were stable and the economy was growing.
Banks that did not actively seek risk were unlikely to find themselves
approaching insolvency. Second, deposit insurance fulfilled its mission of
preventing bank runs. Insured depositors no longer responded to either
truth or rumor regarding the health of their bank by withdrawing their
funds en masse." Third, the banking industry's culture of conservatism
has been identified as a factor in maintaining stability. Having lived
through the personal tragedies of the Great Depression, bankers of the
1940s through 1970s are said to have been risk averse by disposition.86
Finally, as analyzed below, the bank regulatory system contributed to
this stability.
84. THE FiRsr FIrrY YEARS, supra note 42, at 36, 65.
85. Between 1934 and 1980, an average of approximately 52% of the deposits in commercial
banks were insured. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 55, at 114. Although uninsured
depositors have more of an incentive to run than do insured depositors, the insurance of a portion of
a bank's deposits reduces the incentive of even uninsured depositors to run. An uninsured depositor
would know that at worst only other uninsured depositors will withdraw their funds, and that even if
the bank must liquidate assets to meet the demands of those depositors, only a portion of the bank's
assets would have to be sold under stress. Consequently, the bank's solvency would not be as
threatened as it would be if the bank faced the possibility of liquidating its entire portfolio. The
greater the percentage of deposits insured, the greater will be the protection for uninsured
depositors.
86. See, e.g., TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-17; Miller, The Future of The Dual Bank-
mg System, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 7 (1987).
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B. The Influence of the Regulatory System on Bank Behavior
An analysis of the incentives created by the bank regulatory system
suggests a powerful explanation for the stability of the pre-1980 period-
and for the instability that followed. During the pre-1980 period, the
separation of banking from other types of financial services insulated the
banking industry from competition with other financial institutions. No
other institution was permitted to offer the savings, payment, and credit
services that banks provided, and none had developed effective substi-
tutes for those services. Moreover, banks were protected from intra-in-
dustry competition in many local markets. Branching restrictions and
regulatory limits on the issuance of new bank charters restrained compe-
tition among banks. In addition, the Banking Act of 1933 prohibited
banks from paying interest on demand deposits and authorized the Fed-
eral Reserve Board to regulate the rates paid on other deposits. This
arrangement had the effect of an industry-wide price-fixing cartel.8 7
Protection from interindustry and intra-industry competition allowed
banks to achieve a level of profitability that they could not have achieved
under competitive conditions. This profitability has been documented by
empirical analysis of bank costs and earnings." It was also reflected in
87. Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217. Throughout most of the 1933 to 1980 period, the interest.
rate ceilings set by the Federal Reserve were higher than the interest rates most banks paid. Conse-
quently, they only occasionally restricted interest-rate competition among banks. See Gilbert, supra
note 10, at 24-30. Beginning in the late 1970s, market rates increased to levels above the ceilings and
during the early 1980s, the ceilings were removed.
Professor Kenneth Scott coined the term "cartel banking" to describe the regulatory regime dur-
ing this period. Scott, The Uncertain Course of Bank Deregulation, REGULATION, May-June 1981,
at 40.
88. See, e.g., Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM. ECON.
REV. 1183 (1990); Flannery, The Social Costs of Unit Banking Restrictions, 13 J. MONETARY ECON.
237 (1984). Banks in some markets may well have engaged in nonprice competition. One obvious
example was the notorious bank practice of offering toasters, television sets, and other products in
exchange for opening an account at a bank. Another, potentially more damaging, type of competi-
tion took the form of banks increasing their branch offices to improve customer convenience. White,
Price Regulation and Quality Rivalry in a Profit-Maximizing Model: The Case of Bank Branching, 8
J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 97 (1976). Through this competition (which could take place, of
course, only in those states that allowed branching or free entry) banks may have expanded the
capacity of the banking industry beyond that which would have existed under competitive condi-
tions. When protection from competition ceased to exist, see infra Part III, this expansion may have
exacerbated the problem of excess capacity and impaired the efficiency of over-expanded banks. A
similar sequence of events occurred in the airline industry where prices had been fixed by regulation
and were later deregulated. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 257-58 (3d ed. 1986);
Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975).
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banks' loan-pricing procedures, which indicated a lack of competition. s9
The availability of supracompetitive profits, or rents, would be expected
to offset the deposit insurance subsidy and to reduce both shareholders'
and managers' incentives to incur risk.'
In analyzing this phenomenon, it is useful to employ the following ma-
trix, the contents of which are discussed below.
Pre-1980 Bank Business Strategies
Risk-Adjusted Return on Assets
Sut)racompetitive Competitive Sub-Competitive
High Risk
Low Risk
The six cells of the matrix represent a simplified set of alternative busi-
ness strategies for a bank. Each strategy is characterized by a level of
risk-either high risk or low risk-and a level of risk-adjusted return on
assets, measured in relation to the return that would be achieved under
conditions of perfect competition. "High risk" is defined as a strategy
that entails a significant possibility that the bank will become insolvent
and thus subject to closure by the FDIC. "Low-risk" is defined as any
lower level of risk. For example, the strategy represented by the top left
cell involves a high level of risk and a risk-adjusted return that is greater
than the level that would be achieved under conditions of perfect
competition. 9'
89. See, eg., Brady, Changes in Loan Pricing and Business Lending at Commercial Banks, 71
FED. RESERVE BULL. 1 (1985) (loan pricing tied to a "prime" rate, which was a relatively arbitrary
benchmark that facilitated parallel pricing practices).
90. Keeley, supra note 88, at 1190-98 (providing empirical support for this effect).
91. Each of these "strategies" could represent a wide range of actual business strategies, which
would include specific mixes of customer targeting, marketing and financing. The reduction of each
strategy to two variables-risk and return-is a simplification, but these variables are all that is
needed for the analysis that follows.
available to available to not relevant
banks in pro- banks in unpro- during pre-1980
tected markets tected markets period
but subsidy off-
set by threat of
losing franchise
value
available to available to not relevant
banks in pro- banks in unpro- during pre-1980
tected markets tected markets period
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This analysis, which is repeated in Part III for the post-1980 period,
proceeds as follows. The first step is to determine the availability of each
of the six strategies. The next step is to analyze how rational bank share-
holders and managers would select from among the available strategies.
The final step of the analysis is to draw inferences regarding the effect of
the regulatory system on the performance of the banking industry. Infer-
ences regarding the pre-1980 period will be compared below to inferences
regarding the post-1980 period and will be used as a basis for analyzing
bank regulatory reform.92
Protection from competition during the pre-1980 period would be ex-
pected to afford banks the opportunity to earn supracompetitive returns
on assets, and indeed there is empirical evidence that banks in fact earned
such returns. Because this protection depended on local market condi-
tions and on state branching laws and chartering practices, however, not
all banks could earn supracompetitive returns.93 Thus one can think of
banks during this period as being divided into two groups, one of which
operated in protected markets and one of which operated in competitive
markets.94
Protection from competition had two effects on banks. First, it al-
lowed them to earn supracompetitive returns. Thus, banks could pay
below-market interest rates for deposits, or charge above-market rates for
loans, or both.95 Consequently, the Low-Risk Supracompetitive-Return
Strategy was available to banks that enjoyed this protection. This strat-
egy could have involved, for example, providing traditional banking serv-
ices in a market in which branching and entry were restricted.
Second, banks that enjoyed protection from competition would have
92. The analysis that follows draws inferences regarding bank behavior-specifically the selec-
tion of a business strategy-based on market structure, which in this industry is heavily influenced
by the regulatory regime. This form of analysis necessarily involves generalization. Individual
banks have unique sets of strengths and weaknesses, which influence their behavior. As a result, a
particular bank that operates in a protected market, for example, may not be able to earn a
supracompetitive return, and, in the short run at least, it may not be taken over by a group of
managers or shareholders that can. This possibility, however, does not invalidate the inference that
banks in protected markets will generally adopt strategies that achieve supracompetitive returns,
93. Keeley, supra note 88, at 1190-98 (empirical analysis demonstrating that some banks
earned rents as a result of regulatory protection in local markets and that those that did took less
risk). The capitalized value of the rents were embedded in the rates a bank paid on deposits or
earned on loans.
94. The interest-rate ceilings alone did not eliminate competition because they were set above
the prevailing rates through most of the 1933 to 1980 period, and because banks could compete on
the basis of factors other than price. See supra notes 87-88.
95. See Keeley, supra note 88, at 1192.
[Vol. 69:695
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/4
1991] ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BANK REFORM
been penalized for adopting high-risk strategies. In addition to losing
their net worth in the event of a failure, in all likelihood they would have
lost an additional value known as "franchise value," which represents a
bank's ability to earn profits in the future and which would be reflected in
the market value of a bank's equity.96 The more profitable a bank is, the
greater will be its franchise value. Thus, a bank that operated in a pro-
tected market risked forfeiting a high franchise value to the FDIC if it
were to allow its net worth to fall to zero.9 7
The penalty of forfeiting franchise value would have offset the deposit
insurance subsidy for banks in protected markets up to a certain level of
risk.98 In order to extract a subsidy greater than the penalty, a bank
would have had to adopt a strategy that carried such a high risk that
potential losses exceeded the sum of the bank's net worth and its
96. To avoid double counting, franchise value should be measured by taking the net present
value of the bank's future profits and subtracting an amount equal to its net worth.
97. When the FDIC enters into a purchase and assumption transaction, it in effect sells the
failed bank's franchise to the acquiring bank. If the franchise value were greater than the negative
net worth of the failed bank, the FDIC would be required to pay the shareholders of the failed bank
an amount equal to the difference. That is, the FDIC has no authority to make a profit when closing
a failed bank. In such a case, the bank would not lose its franchise value. In fact, however, the
shareholders of a failed bank never receive such a payment. This may be due to: (I) a delay prior to
closing a failed bank during which time negative net worth may increase to a magnitude greater than
franchise value; (2) inefficiency in the FDIC's auction process for purchase and assumption transac-
tions; (3) inefficiency in the FDIC's sale of the assets that an acquiror may choose to leave with the
FDIC; or (4) the administrative costs of the FDIC's resolution. To the extent that a bank continues
to take risk and to incur losses that exceed its going concern value, the loss of its franchise value is
not a penalty. Loss of franchise value attributable to causes (2) through (4), however, is a penalty.
This distinction is not made in Keeley, supra note 88. His empirical results imply, however, that
banks at least expect some penalty in the event of a failure.
98. Keeley, supra note 88, at 1185-86; Marcus, Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy, 8 J.
BANKING & FIN. 557 (1984) (formal model of relationship between franchise value and risk-taking).
This effect can be illustrated using the hypothetical strategies described in Section I-A. Recall that
the three alternative strategies offered expected values of $25, $50, and $50 to the bank shareholders.
If a bank had a franchise value of S100, which it would lose in the event of a failure, the expected
values of the second and third strategies would change. (The expected value of the first strategy
would not change because that strategy did not entail a possibility of failure.) Each of the second
and third strategies involved a fifty percent chance of failure. Therefore, the expected value of these
strategies would decline by $50 (.5 x $100) to $0, leaving the first, low-risk strategy the most attrac-
tive.
Because banks are closed or otherwise resolved when their net worth falls to zero on a book value
basis, a going concern value greater than book value net worth does not effect the time of the closing.
A bank with going concern value above its book value net worth would be closed when its book
value net worth falls to zero. The bank's shareholders would lose the residual going concern value of
the bank when the bank is resolved, and the FDIC would theoretically realize that value when it, in
effect, sells the going concern value to an acquiror of the failed bank. See supra notes 49-51 and
accompanying text (purchase and assumption transactions).
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franchise value.9 9 Depending on a bank's level of profitability, this may
well have required such a high level of risk-taking that the regulators
would have been able to prevent it."oc Thus, one can infer that the avail-
ability and the magnitude of the deposit insurance subsidy were not lim-
ited for a major segment of the banking industry during this period.
Moreover, depending on the level of a bank's profitability, the cost of the
prospective forfeiture of its franchise value could have offset the deposit
insurance subsidy entirely, and could have been even greater than the
value of the deposit insurance subsidy for any feasible range of risk-tak-
ing. Consequently, for banks that enjoyed protection from competition,
the High-Risk Supracompetitive-Return Strategy could well have been
subject to a net tax. 01
The effect of a bank's forfeiture of its franchise value is similar to the
effect of a deductible on risk-taking by an insured. A higher deductible
requires the insured to bear more of the cost of the insured-against event.
Accordingly, the insured can be expected to take greater care in avoiding
that event."0 2 For shareholders of banks in protected markets, therefore,
the Low-Risk Supracompetitive-Return Strategy may well have been
more attractive than the High-Risk Supracompetitive-Return Strategy.
Moreover, bank managers' preferences would have led them to adopt the
Low-Risk Supracompetitive-Return Strategy. Because they are dispro-
portionately invested in their jobs, managers generally prefer low-risk
strategies over high-risk strategies. Consequently, one would expect the
protected segment of the banking industry to adopt the Low-Risk
Supracompetitive-Return Strategy.
For banks that did not enjoy protection from competition, a
supracompetitive return was not generally available. These banks would
99. See supra note 96 (the relationship between net worth and franchise value).
100. The bank regulators' job was easier when most banks provided a similar set of services and
served similar markets. In addition, because brokered deposits were not available during most of
this period, a bank could not very easily raise new funds and irrevocably alter its risk profile in
between examinations. Regulators, therefore, may have been able to detect increases in risk-taking
earlier in the process.
101. The tax would have been equal to the difference between the expected value of the deposit
insurance subsidy and the (greater) expected value of the forfeiture of the franchise.
102. The shareholders' loss of franchise value could also be viewed as analogous to coinsurance.
Because a bank is deemed insolvent, and the FDIC's contingent liability becomes payable, when a
bank becomes insolvent on a book value basis, one could characterize the resolution of a bank with
residual franchise value as one in which the FDIC makes a payment to the insured depositors and
the bank's shareholders make a payment to the FDIC equal to the amount of the bank's franchise
value.
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have had available either the High-Risk Competitive-Return Strategy or
the Low-Risk Competitive-Return Strategy. Some banks that adopted
the former would have extracted the deposit insurance subsidy but then
passed it on to either depositors or borrowers as a result of competition,
retaining only enough of the subsidy to provide a risk-adjusted normal
return to shareholders."0 3 Banks that adopted the Low-Risk Competi-
tive-Return Strategy would have earned unsubsidized competitive profits
by conservatively providing traditional banking services."°
Assuming that shareholders of unprotected banks hold perfectly diver-
sified portfolios, they would have been indifferent between the two com-
petitive-return strategies.1 0 5 Bank managers, however, would have
preferred the Low-Risk Competitive-Return Strategy, 1" particularly be-
cause there would have been no sacrifice of shareholder interests entailed
in adopting this strategy.
In sum, the stability of the banking system between 1933 and 1980
seems to be attributable at least in part to the incentives created by the
regulatory system. The protection from competition that a segment of
the banking industry enjoyed created a penalty for risk-taking that offset
the deposit insurance subsidy and that, for banks with very high
franchise values, could have created a net tax for risk-taking. 107 As a
result, one would expect a low level of risk-taking within this part of the
industry. For banks that operated in competitive markets, managerial
preferences for low levels of risk, along with shareholder indifference to
risk, would also be expected to lead to a low level of risk-taking, although
103. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (effect of competition on the subsidy).
104. The Sub-Competitive-Return Strategies were also available. However, the availability of
more competitive options rendered these strategies unnecessary. They are therefore not considered
in this stage of the analysis.
105. The assumption that shareholders hold a diversified portfolio of investments is reasonable
in the context of a publicly held bank. In the context of a privately held bank, where at least some
large shareholders may be managers as well, shareholders may not have diversified portfolios. Pre-
sumably they would be risk averse. To the extent they are, their incentives would be similar to those
of managers. For a theoretical analysis of the incentives of both shareholders and managers of a
bank to take risk, see Furlong & Keeley, Bank Capital Regulation and Asset Risk, EcONOMiC RE-
VIEW, Spring 1987, at 20 (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco).
106. The expectation that bank managers would avoid risk is consistent with the popular image
of bankers at the time, who were sometimes referred to as leading the "3-6-3 life"-borrow at 3%,
lend at 6%, and be on the golf course by 3:00 p.m.
107. To the extent this was true, there would have been a socially undesirable underinvestment
in risky projects during this period. This may have been reflected in the low bank failure rate during
this period. In addition, the inefficiencies that generally occur in the absence of competition were
another cost society paid for this period of stability.
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one would have expected to find some high risk-taking within this seg-
ment of the industry.
III. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY AFTER 1980
The period of stability in the banking industry ended in the late
1970s. 1°s Although the regulatory system had remained largely un-
changed, the market for financial services had changed dramatically. In-
centives that had previously promoted stability dissipated, and the
inherent destabilizing elements of the regulatory system appear to have
had a dominant effect on the industry's performance.
A. Record of Instability
In 1980, there were 10 bank failures involving approximately $236 mil-
lion in bank assets. In 1985 there were 120 failures involving approxi-
mately $9 billion in assets. And in 1988 and 1989 there were 200 and
206 failures respectively, involving a total of approximately $65 billion in
assets.' 09 From 1980 to the end of 1989, the FDIC's insurance fund fell
from a level of 1.16% to .7% of insured deposits, its lowest level ever.110
Furthermore, the savings and loan industry, which had unique problems
but operated in a regulatory and economic environment somewhat simi-
lar to that of the banking industry, experienced failures that, at current
government estimates, will cost the taxpayer between $130 billion and
$176 billion in deposit insurance payments."1 '
B. The Modern Market For Financial Services
The market for bank services has changed dramatically in the last 15
years. Until the mid-1970s, banks were the primary repository of sav-
ings, and the primary providers of short-term credit for a substantial seg-
ment of American business. In addition, banks had become major
providers of home mortgage and consumer financing. In short, the regu-
108. Recall that the use of 1980 as a transition year is necessarily artificial. See supra note 5.
109. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 55, at 101.
110. Id. at 114.
111. ECONOMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 42, at 167 (1991). Unlike banks, sav-
ings and loan associations were legally required to hold a high proportion of thirty-year fixed-rate
loans in their portfolios, which were financed by short-term deposits. Consequently, savings and
loans were much more vulnerable to interest rate risk. For a discussion of the causes of the savings
and loan failures and the similarities between the regulatory environment of the savings and loan and
the banking industries, see L. WHITE, supra note 77; E. KANE, THE S & L INSURANCE MESS: How
DID IT HAPPEN (1989).
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latory system was effective in holding back market forces to maintain the
banking industry's protected preserve. Beginning in the mid-1970s, how-
ever, technological and market forces began to erode the industry's privi-
leged position.
As other authors have demonstrated, by the early 1980s, the banking
industry had lost its captive markets.' 12 Banks now compete for deposits
with mutual funds, securities firms, and thrifts, all of which provide ac-
counts that to many holders offer most of the services that bank accounts
offer, plus, in some cases, additional services such as convenient means of
making securities purchases and sales. 113
Furthermore, many of banks' traditional borrowers, including essen-
tially all blue chip corporations, now obtain short-term credit directly
from anonymous lenders in the commercial paper market at rates that
cannot support the banks' overhead. Other businesses as well as individ-
uals borrow from finance companies, which fund themselves with com-
mercial paper. Among these finance companies are affiliates of major
commercial and industrial firms, including, for example, General Mo-
tors, General Electric, AT&T, and Sears, Roebuck. In 1980, the ratio of
bank loans to commercial paper outstanding was over two to one. In
1989, that ratio had fallen to 1.2 to one." 4 Banks also have lost lending
business to the markets for securitized mortgage loans, car loans, con-
sumer loans, and other loans that can be repackaged into securities and
traded on securities markets." 5 Although banks earn fees for providing
stand-by letters of credit for commercial paper and for originating loans
that are later securitized, the returns available for holding these loans has
fallen.16
In addition, intra-industry competition among banks has increased.
112. Eisenbeis, Regulation and Financial Innovation: Implications for Financial Structure and
Competition Among Depository and Non-Depository Institutions, 4 ISSUES IN BANK REG., Winter
1981, at 15; R. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 41-49 (1987); TREASURY REPORT, supra note
3, XVIII-9-12; Macey & Miller, America's Banking System: The Origins and Future of the Current
Crisis, 69 WASH. U.L.Q. 769 (1991); Rosenblum & Siegel, Competition in Financial Services" the
Impact of Nonbank Entry, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE IN BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPE-
TITION I (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1983); Swire, The Good Old Days Disappear in Banking
Regulation, VA. L. REP., Summer 1991, at 21.
113. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at XVIII-9-10.
114. Id. at 1-26 (fig. 10). In 1960 the ratio was close to ten to one. Id.
115. Id. at 1-26 (fig. 12).
116. For a discussion of bank strategies in the face of shrinking margins on securitized debt, see
Kantrow, As US. Consumers Change, So, Too, Must Banks' Tactics, Am. Banker, April 23, 1991, at
1, col. 1.
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Large deposits are now placed in banks by brokers with nationwide ac-
cess to funds and a nationwide clientele of banks that accept those depos-
its. Much of the deposit market has thus become national in scope.
States have also eased their restrictions on geographic expansion. Intra-
state branching is permitted in many states, as is interstate expansion
through holding company affiliates. Finally, the Federal Reserve Board
has allowed banks to open "loan production offices" outside the state in
which they are headquartered. Thus many local loan markets have been
opened to increased competition among banks.117
Finally, the macro-economic environment in which banks operated
also changed between the 1970s and 1980s. Interest rates rose sharply in
1979 and have been volatile since then.' 8 The initial increase in interest
rates caught some banks with mismatched asset and liability maturities.
These banks were forced to pay higher interest rates to retain their de-
posits, but they continued earning low interest rates on their existing
loans. On a market-value basis, those banks suffered a decline in their
net worth as a result of the devaluation of the fixed-rate loans they made
before 1979.119 Moreover, after the initial rise, interest rate volatility had
two effects on banks. It challenged bank managers, who had little experi-
ence in managing interest-rate risk, to adopt methods of protecting banks
from swings in interest rates; and it offered banks ready opportunities to
take risk if they chose to do so.
As a result of these changes in the financial services markets, bank
profitability has declined substantially since the late 1970s. Banks' aver-
age return on equity during the period 1975 to 1979 was 12.38%. For
the periods 1980 to 1984 and 1985 to 1989, return on equity fell to
12.13% and 8.88%, respectively. Behind these figures, however, there is
a wide variation in the profitability of different segments of the banking
industry. Most notably, the money center banks, which were directly
affected by the expansion of the commercial paper market, experienced a
decline in their return on equity from 13.06% during the first half of the
1980s to 3.37% during the second half.12 0 Moreover, the riskiness of
117. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-26 (fig. 11). For a more complete discussion of the
ways in which interstate competition among banks has increased, see Miller, supra note 40, at 183.
87.
118. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-25 (fig. 8).
119. This effect was devastating for savings and loan institutions, which had been legally re-
quired to hold long-term home mortgage loans financed by short-term deposits. See L. WHITE,
supra note 77, at 61-65.
120. Danker & McLaughlin, Profitability of Insured Commercial Banks in 1984, 71 FED. RE-
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banks increased during this period. This increased risk is reflected not
only in the bank failure statistics cited above, but also in the increasing
rate of loan chargeoffs. During the 1970s, net loan chargeoffs were .39%
of loans and leases. That figure increased to .57% during the first half of
the 1980s, and to .99% during the second half of the 1980s. t2 ' This in-
crease in bank riskiness is similarly reflected in the interest rates banks
pay on their nondeposit liabilities. The risk premiums embedded in these
rates rose substantially in 1979 and have remained high since then.122
The decline in bank profitability and the increase in bank risk have
been reflected in declining values of publicly traded bank stocks. In
1975, the Salomon Brothers 35 Bank Index was fifty-five percent of the
Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Index. By 1980, it had declined to ap-
proximately fifty percent, and by 1989, it had fallen to thirty-eight
percent.123
A portion of the decline in risk-adjusted bank profitability can be at-
tributed to the loss of supracompetitive returns that banks suffered due to
increased competition. The loss of protection from competition would be
expected to cause returns to bank shareholders to fall to competitive risk-
adjusted levels. The returns of many banks, however, may well have
fallen below those levels.
The recent entry of nonbank financial institutions into markets previ-
ously reserved for banks appears to have created a situation in which
banks have become relatively inefficient producers in markets with excess
capacity. 124 Generally, when excess capacity exists in an industry, com-
SERVE BULL. 836, 842 (1985) (charting return on equity for 1980-1985); Duca & McLaughlin, De-
velopments Affecting the Profitability of Commercial Banks, 76 FED. RESERVE BULL. 477, 483
(1990) (same for 1985-1989); Opper, Profitability of Insured Commercial Banks, 1979, 66 FED. RE-
SERVE BULL. 691, 699 (1980) (same for 1973-1979). See also TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at
1-25 (fig. 7) (downward trend in return on assets).
121. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-25 (Table 6).
122. Carroll & Rolnick, After Penn Square The Insurance Dilemma in PROCEEDINGS OF A
CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 243, 250-53 (Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, 1983). Furlong, Changes in Bank Risk Taking, ECON. REV., Spring 1988, at 45.
123. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-25 (fig. 9).
124. Excess capacity in this context refers to the quantity of assets devoted to the banking busi-
ness, which is not necessarily related to the quantity of banks in the industry. I am not aware of any
empirical studies of bank capacity and its use. The pattern of declining profitability and increasing
failure, along with new entry by nonbank firms into banking markets, are consistent with the pres-
ence of excess capacity. In addition, observations of bankers that they must change their business
strategies to rely less on traditional lending, and predictions of a shrinkage of the banking industry,
support this view. See, eg., Roosevelt, What's Ahead? Fewer Banks, Fewer Bankers, Fatter Profits,
Am. Banker, April 16, 1991, at 1, col. 1; Lipin, As Loans Slip, Banks Push New Products and Strat-
egy, Am. Banker, April 30, 1991, at 1, col. 1.
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petition drives prices below the competitive level. The least efficient
firms fail, and other firms redeploy their resources to new markets
through internal expansion or merger and acquisition. In such a situa-
tion, prices are set below the average cost of the industry until the excess
capacity is withdrawn. The most efficient firms may be able to set prices
equal to their average cost125 and thereby earn a risk-adjusted market
rate of return on their assets under these conditions. 126 Other firms,
however, cannot cover their fixed costs. Those that can sell at prices
above their average variable costs continue to operate until they can no
longer maintain their fixed assets. Those that cannot cover their variable
costs should cease operation. Depending on the value of its assets to
other firms, a firm forced to set prices below average total cost might be
better off selling assets or merging with another firm that can use its
assets more efficiently either within the same industry or in another in-
dustry. A firm that cannot set prices above average variable cost would
necessarily be better off selling its assets or merging.
To the extent that excess capacity exists in segments of the banking
industry, one would expect lower profits, failures, and reorganizations of
banks and their affiliates. Although additional empirical work would be
enlightening, there is reason to believe that the bank regulatory system
has distorted this adjustment process in a way that has increased bank
failures, reduced profitability, and impeded the redeployment of bank re-
sources to more efficient uses.
C. Influence of the Bank Regulatory System on Bank Behavior
The influence of the bank regulatory system on the banking industry
has changed dramatically since 1980. In response to the entry of other
financial institutions into banks' traditional markets, some banks have
experienced pressure to redeploy their resources to other markets. The
bank regulatory system, however, has impeded this process by restricting
the parties that may purchase bank assets or merge with banks. As a
result, pressure created by excess capacity has been concentrated in those
markets in which banks are permitted to operate. If this were the only
125. This would include fixed and variable costs.
126. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 112-14
(2d ed. 1980). Rigidities that impede the reallocation of capital create this type of situation. In the
case of the banking industry, one rigidity discussed below is the regulatory system. Another well
known example of a market with excess capacity is the textile manufacturing market. Many low.
cost producers from less developed countries have entered this market. Id.
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effect of the regulatory system, one would expect to find a greater than
optimal level of bank failure. By subsidizing banks that take high levels
of risk, however, the regulatory system compounds the distortion. The
deposit insurance subsidy creates an outlet for banks needing to escape
markets in which nonbanking firms have become the most efficient pro-
ducers. The availability of the subsidy allows banks to redeploy their
resources into high-risk loan markets. This section analyzes the effect of
bank regulation on banks' responses to the post-1980 market conditions
and suggests that regulation may at least partially explain the poor per-
formance of the banking industry during the post-1980 period.
Banking organizations operating in markets in which nonbanks have
entered have a choice in the long run between moving to new markets
that do not have excess capacity or remaining in their current markets
and achieving a sufficiently high level of efficiency to compete with other
banks and with nonbank entrants. Otherwise, they will eventually fail.
Regulatory restrictions, however, limit the ability of banking oganiza-
tions to respond in either of these ways. By constraining the services
banking organizations may provide, the regulatory system impedes their
ability to redeploy resources from banking markets with excess capacity
to other financial services markets. In addition, the system impedes
banking organizations from achieving economies of scope by expanding
across product and service markets.
Deposit insurance has also influenced banks' ability to respond to the
influx of nonbank financial institutions into their traditional markets.
Although deposit insurance has always subsidized risk-taking, regula-
tory protection from competition during the pre-1980 period offset the
subsidy by creating enhanced bank franchise values for many banks. The
erosion of bank profitability in the 1980s, however, reduced bank
franchise values and thereby unharnessed the deposit insurance subsidy
of risk-taking. The increased availability of the deposit insurance subsidy
had the effect of increasing the attractiveness of high-risk business strate-
gies even in the absence of nonbanking competition. Because the subsidy
is available only to banks, however, the deposit insurance subsidy gives
banks an advantage over other financial institutions in providing high-
risk loans. In competing to provide a high-risk loan, if all other factors
are equal, a bank would be able to out-bid a nonbank as a result of the
deposit insurance subsidy. Moreover, the arithmetic of the subsidy offers
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the greatest advantage to the least profitable banks. 27 Banks whose
profitability has declined as a result of excess capacity, therefore, have a
particularly strong incentive to adopt higher-risk strategies.
The same matrix used above is helpful in analyzing this dynamic.
Post-1980 Bank Business Strategies
Risk-Adjusted Return on Assets
Supracompetitive Competitive Sub-Competitive
High Risk
Low Risk
The changes that have occurred in the financial services market since
1980 eliminated the possibility that banks can earn supracompetitive re-
turns on a sustained basis.t2 Either interindustry or intra-industry com-
petition would preclude such profitability. Even banks that avail
themselves of the deposit insurance subsidy are forced by competitive
pressure from other banks to pass the subsidy on to borrowers and de-
positors, leaving banks at best with competitive returns. Consequently,
neither Supracompetitive-Return Strategy is generally available to banks.
At best, the Competitive-Return Strategies are available. These strate-
gies are available to banks that operate in markets without excess capac-
ity. An example of this type of market is a community bank market in
which banks have not lost their loan clientele. 12 9 Both the High-Risk
and the Low-Risk Competitive-Return Strategies are available in this
127. When a bank's going concern value (market value net worth plus any additional franchise
value) increases, its subsidy decreases. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
128. Some banks may have unique attributes that allow them to earn supraeompetitive profits.
The point here is that with competition, this should occur rarely.
129. See, eg., Klinkerman, Small Banks, Stars of the '80s, Gird for Tough Fight Ahead, Am.
Banker, May 7, 1991, at 1, col. I (describing small bank success in "[s]ticking to their home
markets").
unavailable dur- subsidized - subsidized-
ing post-1980 available to the pursued by less
period most efficient efficient banks
banks in markets in markets with
with excess excess capacity
capacity
unavailable dur- available to precluded by
ing post-1980 banks in markets shareholders
period with no excess
capacity
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type of market. Managerial incentives, however, would create a bias to-
ward the Low-Risk Competitive-Return Strategy.
Banks that operate in markets with excess capacity could also adopt a
Competitive-Return Strategy if they are, or can become, efficient relative
to competing banks and other financial institutions. Because deposit in-
surance gives banks a competitive advantage over other financial institu-
tions in pricing high-risk loans, however, one would expect these banks
to tend to adopt the High-Risk Competitive-Return Strategy rather than
the Low-Risk Competitive-Return Strategy.1 30
The remaining banks-the less efficient banks in excess capacity mar-
kets-do not have a Competitive-Return Strategy available. Among
those banks, a conflict between management and shareholders could
arise. If such a bank had the opportunity to merge with another firm
that could use the bank's assets more efficiently, the shareholders would
prefer to merge rather than to earn returns on the bank's assets that are
lower than the risk-adjusted market rate.13 1 If a merger partner is not
available, the shareholders would prefer to liquidate so long as the ex-
pected proceeds of the liquidation are greater than the present value of
the bank's future earnings. Managers of these less efficient banks, on the
other hand, would seek to avoid the loss of autonomy and the loss of jobs
that would accompany either a merger or a liquidation. One would ex-
pect managers, therefore, to attempt to disguise the fact that their share-
holders would be better off with a merger or liquidation. Empirical
analyses have shown that shareholders can indeed be misled in this way
when banks assume high levels of risk. This can occur because the riski-
ness of a bank's loan portfolio is inherently difficult to assess. 132 High
current returns may appear satisfactory to shareholders if they cannot
130. To the extent that a bank has both strategies available, however, managerial incentives
would create a bias toward the adoption of the Low-Risk Strategy with no sacrifice of shareholder
interests.
131. The issue here is whether the present value of the expected profits of the bank are greater
than or less than the expected proceeds of a merger.
132. Randall, Can the Market Evaluate Asset Quality Exposure in Banks, NEw ENG. EcoN.
REV., July-Aug. 1989, at 3 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston); Gilbert, Market Discipline of Bank
Risk. Theory and Evidence, 72 ECONOMIc REVIEW, Jan.-Feb., 1990, at 3 (Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis)(reviewing empirical studies of market discipline and criticizing Randall's study). The
theoretical explanation of this phenomenon is that banks specialize in holding assets that are costly
to evaluate. Their comparative advantage over the securities markets in providing credit lies in their
ability to assess the idiosyncratic risk of a project or enterprise. Bank portfolios thus consist of a
large number of loans, the riskiness of which is difficult to ascertain. One would therefore expect
shareholders to be less than perfect in assessing bank profitability. Diamond & Dybvig, supra note
80, at 58-60.
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accurately assess the underlying riskiness of the bank's portfolio. Thus
managers of banks that cannot earn a competitive profit can be expected
to adopt the High-Risk Sub-Competitive-Return Strategy in an attempt
to avoid shareholder pressure to merge or liquidate. 133
In addition, a special scenario of bank risk-taking occurs when a bank
is close to insolvency and faces the immediate threat of regulatory clo-
sure. The closure of a bank exacts a penalty from management in lost
jobs and damaged reputations, and from shareholders in the loss of eq-
uity remaining in the bank.134 As the threat of regulatory closure in-
creases, managers have a particularly strong incentive to adopt a high-
risk strategy, regardless of the prospective risk-adjusted return from the
gamble. If they take risks that pay off quickly, they may be able to re-
store the bank's capital to a level that prevents closure, and buy time in
which to reassess their long-term strategy. The managers of a bank that
is about to be closed have nothing to lose by adopting such a strategy.
Depending upon the expected proceeds of voluntary liquidation and the
availability of merger partners, bank shareholders may have an incentive
to take this gamble as well. Moreover, even if a voluntary liquidation or
merger would be more attractive to shareholders than risking their re-
maining equity in a gamble that carries a below-market rate of return,
managers may be able to prevent shareholders from evaluating the gam-
ble in time to prevent them from taking it. Consequently, as regulatory
closure approaches, banks are likely to adopt very high-risk strategies.
The incentives of banks earning below-market profits, including those
facing immediate closure, would exist with or without the deposit insur-
ance subsidy. The subsidy, however, increases a bank's expected return
from risk-taking and thereby expands the volume of high-risk business
available to banks at a given rate of risk-adjusted return. In addition, by
133. Ordinarily, one would expect management of a corporation to be biased in favor of assum-
ing a low level of risk. Overinvestment in their jobs tends to make managers averse to the risk of
failure, which normally leads them to manage in a manner that avoids risk. In the context of an
unprofitable bank, however, managers' most pressing concern is either closure by the regulator or
shareholder pressure to merge or liquidate. To the extent that managers can deceive the regulator
and shareholders by increasing risk, their interest in keeping their jobs would lead them to do so.
134. When the FDIC resolves a bank, even in a purchase and assumption transaction, it almost
always forces management to resign. In addition, if a bank regulator determines that a bank is
operating in an unsafe or unsound manner or that it is in an unsafe or unsound condition, it often
forces management resignations. See Bovenzi & Muldoon, supra note 51, at 5-6. Because regula-
tory closure decisions are based on findings of insolvency made on the basis of historical cost ac-
counting, even a bank that operates in a competitive market may have positive equity at the point of
closure.
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eliminating the need for depositors to assess the riskiness of a bank before
making a deposit, deposit insurance allows a bank to raise funds very
quickly. This in turn allows a bank to make new loans or other invest-
ments and thereby increase its risk quickly. The services of deposit bro-
kers further facilitate this process. The result is that with deposit
insurance bank managers are more likely to be able to adopt a high-risk
strategy without the regulator's or their shareholders' knowledge than if
deposit insurance were not available. 135
In sum, the combination of excess bank capacity and deposit insurance
has created two sources of bias toward risk-taking. First, efficient banks
can compete most effectively against nonbank competitors by increasing
their risk and thereby extracting the deposit insurance subsidy. Second,
the best opportunity for managers of inefficient banks to avoid liquida-
tion, merger, or forced closure is to increase risk. 136
There remains a question regarding the extent to which the increased
risk observed in the banking industry since 1980 is attributable to delib-
erate decisions to take risk in response to the incentives discussed above.
Environmental factors, including regional and sectoral recessions, surely
have been at work as well. Although it is difficult to attribute riskiness to
one or the other cause, and although additional empirical work would be
useful, there is empirical support for the hypothesis that a major portion
of bank riskiness during this period was the result of bank managers'
deliberate decisions.
135. This problem could exist even if deposit insurance were priced correctly. To eliminate the
problem, the deposit insurer would have to reprice insurance continuously, or at least at any point at
which a bank proposes to make a large volume of new investments. Alternatively, growth restric-
tions could be imposed on banks, or the ability to raise deposits rapidly could be restricted by, for
instance, limiting the use of brokered deposits. See infra notes 215, 218-219 and accompanying text.
Constraints on the market for control of banks-including the limitations on bank affiliates and
regulatory control over the bank acquisitions-also reduce the pressure on bank managers to act in
the interest of shareholders. See Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market
for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1153, 1212-25 (1988).
136. In addition, a secondary effect of increased risk-taking in the banking industry is to create
pressure on banks that have the option of pursuing low-risk strategies. Consider, for example, a low-
risk bank that competes with a bank that has just decided to pursue a high-risk strategy. In order to
pursue that strategy, the latter bank would have to raise a high volume of funds in order to finance
new risky investments. Consequently, the bank would have to raise the interest rates it pays on
deposits. In order to keep its deposits, the low-risk bank might have to raise its rates as well. The
low-risk bank would find it difficult, however, to pay high interest rates to depositors and yet con-
tinue to earn low returns on its loan portfolio, even if the portfolio carries a very low level of risk.
The low-risk bank, therefore, may be forced to seek higher-risk loans that pay an interest rate com-
mensurate with the rate it is paying depositors. The practice of deposit brokerage, which creates a
nationwide market for deposits, exacerbates this problem.
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In 1988, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency released a study
of bank failures that concluded that eighty percent of the banks that
failed between 1979 and 1987 had "overly aggressive" management. The
study found that banks that failed during this period had disproportion-
ately pursued high-growth strategies. Although a high rate of growth
does not necessarily imply a high level of risk, these observations are
consistent with the hypothesis that bank managers actively sought to in-
crease risk by making substantial changes in their portfolios. The Comp-
troller's study further found that the boards of directors of banks that
failed were disproportionately uninformed regarding the bank's business,
which supports the hypothesis that bank management can prevent share-
holders from becoming aware of the fact that they have adopted a high-
risk strategy. 137 Another study of bank failures, the findings of which are
consistent with the Comptroller's study, revealed that many failed banks
had pursued strategies of rapid loan growth fueled by lending outside
their normal area of business. Again, this implies that a deliberate
change of strategy had occurred. That study found that those banks
charged rates of interest substantially above regional averages, which fur-
ther supports the hypothesis that bank risk-taking was part of a deliber-
ate business strategy. 138
IV. OBJECTIVES OF BANK REGULATORY REFORM
The overarching goal of bank regulatory reform should be to allow
banks and their affiliates to respond to evolving market forces, both in
determining the services to provide and the level of risk to assume.
Under an ideal regulatory regime, banks would pursue business strategies
that offer a market rate of return to their shareholders with no subsidy.
Bank resources would thus be put to their most productive uses and so-
cially wasteful projects and enterprises would not be financed.
To achieve this ideal, regulatory reform should eliminate barriers that
137. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE: AN EVALUATION OF THE FACTORS
CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL BANKS (1988). Among this study's findings were
the following: Among banks that failed, 51% had excessive loan growth in relation to management
capability and funding sources, 73% had made loans that were high relative to the borrower's ability
to service its debt, and 37% had unwarranted concentrations of credit to one industry. Id. at 5-7. In
addition, the study found that incompetence was a major source of bank failure.
138. Booker, Management Errors Litter the Steps to the Closed Doors of '82, ABA BANKING J.,
July 1983, at 31. See also Keeton & Morris, Why Do Banks' Loan Losses Differ? 72 ECONOMIC
REvIEW, May 1987, at 3 (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City)(concluding on the basis of statisti-
cal analysis that deliberate risk-taking does occur).
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impede banks from increasing their efficiency within banking markets
and from redeploying resources into other financial services markets in
which they may be put to more productive use. Thus, the restrictions on
service and geographic expansion ideally should be eliminated to allow
banks the opportunity to diversify risk, to achieve economies of scale and
scope, and to facilitate the transfer of resources out of banking markets
with excess capacity. In addition, the deposit insurance subsidy should
be eliminated to the extent feasible.
Under such a regime, banks currently in markets with excess capacity
would have the opportunity either to increase their efficiency and remain
in those markets or to redeploy their resources into other markets.
Banks could no longer gain an advantage over nonbank competitors by
increasing risk. Furthermore, under this type of regime the market for
bank control would have a wider range of potential acquirors, including
banks in other geographic areas and nonbanking firms. The increased
threat of takeovers, coupled with reduced profitability of risk-taking,
would reduce the ability of bank managers to continue operating a bank
that fails to earn a market rate of return for shareholders.
Under the ideal regulatory system, the matrix of potential strategies
for banks would be as follows:
Bank Business Strategies Under Reform
Risk-Adjusted Return on Assets
Supracompetitive Competitive Sub-Competitive
High Risk
Low Risk
Because banks would be subject to competition, they would generally not
be able to earn risk-adjusted returns above the competitive level, and if a
bank is unable to earn a competitive return, it would be merged, liqui-
dated, or otherwise reorganized. The two strategies that would be avail-
able to the typical bank in this ideal regulatory environment would be the
High-Risk Competitive-Return Strategy and the Low-Risk Competitive-
Return Strategy (and everything in between once one leaves the confines
of this simplified typology). To the extent possible within an insurance
arrangement, banks would internalize the costs of the risks they assume.
unavailable available and bank to be
unsubsidized reorganized
unavailable available bank to be
I_ I . reorganized
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The deposit insurance subsidy would be reduced to the minimum
amount feasible. The profitability of the High-Risk Competitive-Return
Strategy, therefore, would reflect the range of returns available in com-
petitive financial services markets. There would be no distortionary pref-
erence in the funding of risky projects and enterprises, and there would
be no competitive advantage accorded the banking industry in relation to
other financial institutions.
In response to the availability of these alternative strategies, one would
expect banks to pursue both high-risk and low-risk strategies. In select-
ing a strategy, a bank would respond to the opportunities presented in its
particular markets. Managers would prefer the latter, and diversified
shareholders would be indifferent between the two.
Despite the objective of allowing banks to be exposed to and to re-
spond to market signals, the elimination of government involvement in
the banking industry does not appear to be an appropriate solution.
Moreover, radical deregulation is politically untenable at least at this
time. A complete rendition of the need for bank regulation is beyond the
scope of this article. 139 A few points of explanation, however, should
serve present purposes.
First, in the absence of governmental involvement, banks would be in-
herently susceptible to wasteful runs, even if they are financially sound.
Although it is unclear how often runs have occurred on solvent banks,
such runs are socially costly. By forcing hasty liquidation of assets, a run
can cause a bank to become insolvent and to fail. Such a failure not only
represents the loss of a valuable economic entity, it also can entail eco-
nomic dislocation in the community the bank serves and transaction
costs of reorganizating the failed bank. In addition, if a run occurs on
the banking system as a whole-an event that has rarely occurred in U.S.
history-severe macro-economic effects would result. Deposit insurance,
along with liquidity assistance available from the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, reduces the threat of a run by guaranteeing that covered depositis
will be protected. 1" It may be that governmentally provided deposit in-
139. See, e.g., Black, Miller & Posner, An Approach to the Regulation of Bank Holding Compa.
nies, 51 J. Bus. 379 (1978); Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L. J. 1
(1976); Fischel, Rosenfield, & Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73
VA. L. REV. 301 (1987); Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals for Fed.
eral Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1971); Stiglitz & Weiss, Credit Rationing in
Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981) (in the presence of imperfect
information, regulation is likely to be needed).
140. See Diamond & Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 1. POL. ECON.
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surance eventually can be replaced with another mechanism to control
the problem of runs. The record of the last ten years demonstrates that
deposit insurance certainly exacts a high price from society in exchange
for preventing runs.141 At this point, however, the elimination of deposit
insurance seems politically untenable. Nonetheless, academics and bank-
ing experts should continue to develop technically supportable
alternatives.
Second, even if deposit insurance is eliminated, a failure or set of fail-
ures that causes widespread losses would give rise to substantial political,
if not economic, pressure on the federal government to bail out deposi-
tors. Past bail-outs of large corporations such as Chrysler provide exam-
ples of this type of situation. Moreover, since large banks would be the
most likely beneficiaries of such an ad hoc bail-out, they would gain a
competitive advantage over other banks. To the extent this occurs, the
current problems of deposit insurance would be recreated.
Third, as discussed above, deposit insurance can provide a subsidy to
banks. Although a goal of regulatory reform should be to eliminate that
subsidy, in practice it may not be possible to do so entirely. Because
insurance relationships always entail some amount of moral hazard,
some level of subsidization to some banks may be part of the price society
pays in order to prevent bank runs. The distortionary effect of that sub-
401, 401-04. Because a bank finances its portfolio of illiquid loans with liquid deposits, there is
always a threat that a large number of depositors will demand repayment of their funds at the same
time. Although the law of large numbers prevents this from occurring in the normal course of
events, massive withdrawals can be triggered by reports, whether correct or not, that the bank is in
financial trouble. In order to comply with its depositors' withdrawal requests, the bank would have
to sell illiquid loans at "firesale" prices, thereby reducing the value of its assets and bringing it closer
to insolvency. Once this process begins, each depositor has an interest in withdrawing his or her
funds early enough in the process to ensure that the bank's remaining assets will cover his or her
withdrawals. When a run occurs on an insolvent bank, the run could be viewed as a satisfactory
means of ensuring the closure of an inefficient bank, although this form of closure could entail sub-
stantial externalities. When a run occurs on a solvent bank, the liquidation of assets and the failure
that could follow is socially undesirable. Theoretically, a run on a solvent bank could be averted by
the Federal Reserve's provision of immediate liquidity assistance. Because the Federal Reserve
would have difficulty determining the solvency of a bank experiencing a run, however, it could in
effect become a deposit insurer in addition to a provider of liquidity.
141. Private deposit insurance is one possibility. See, e.g., P. WALLISON, BACK FROM THE
BRINK: A PRACTICAL PLAN FOR PRIVATIZING DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND STRENGTHENING OUR
BANKS AND THRIFTS (1990); Ely, Yes - Private Sector Depositor Protection Is a Viable Alternative to
Federal Deposit Insurance in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPE-
TITION 338 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1985). A system of liquidity assistance could theo-
retically reduce the need for deposit insurance, but only if the Federal Reserve can easily distinguish
an insolvent bank from an illiquid bank. See supra note 140.
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sidy, however, can be limited by preventing banks from using the subsidy
to finance nonbanking services, particularly those services that unsub-
sidized firms provide. Therefore, banks should be restricted in their abil-
ity to use depositors' funds to finance nonbanking activities. One means
of restricting the incidence of the subsidy, other than disallowing a bank-
ing organization to engage in a nonbanking activity, is to require banking
organizations to use separately incorporated affiliates to provide non-
banking services, and to restrict the transactions between a bank and its
nonbank affiliates. To some extent, this approach is used under current
law.
Fourth, because deposit insurance leaves bank regulators responsible
for monitoring and restraining bank risk-taking, regulation is necessary
to ensure that the activities of a banking organization which impose risks
on the bank, and therefore the FDIC, lie within the supervisory expertise
of the bank regulators. Again, one means of achieving this objective is to
separate nonbanking activities and banking activities into separately in-
corporated entities. 142
The segregation of banking activities from other activities performed
by a bank under an ideal reform regime, however, cannot be complete.
Just as segregation can theoretically wall off the insured bank from non-
banking risks, it also can reduce and potentially eliminate the benefits of
economies of scope. Therefore, a balance must be struck between segre-
gation and integration of a reformed banking organization. 143
V. THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SAFETY AND
CONSUMER CHOICE ACT
FISCCA represents a significant step in the direction of achieving the
regulatory ideal set out above. If enacted, it would bring the most sweep-
ing changes to the legal landscape that the banking industry has exper-
ienced since 1933. Among those changes would be the repeal or
amendment of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Bank Holding Company Act
(including the Douglas Amendment), the McFadden Act, and the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Act, which now contains the insurance provisions
of the Banking Act of 1933 as they have been amended. From an eco-
nomic perspective, however, most of the 361-page bill is devoted to the
establishment of regulatory constraints that reduce the deposit insurance
142. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK POWERS: INSULATING BANKS FROM
THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF EXPANDED AcTIvWTIEs (1987).
143. See id. at 2425.
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subsidy, and the elimination of regulatory constraints that narrow the set
of profitable business strategies available to banks and their affiliates.'"
FISCCA would eliminate most restrictions on the services a banking
organization may perform and on the locations from which it may oper-
ate. Banks or their affiliates would be permitted, for instance, to engage
in securities and insurance activities and, within limits, to integrate those
businesses into regional or national financial services firms. FISCCA
would thus increase the range of business strategies available to banking
organizations. Moreover, there is reason to believe that FISCCA would
make available strategies that are not only more profitable, but also less
risky, than those currently available.
This Part analyzes the ways in which FISCCA would respond to the
weaknesses in the bank regulatory system identified above. A systematic
comparison of FISCCA's reforms with alternative reforms is beyond the
scope of this Article. This Article, therefore, is not intended to take a
position regarding the merit of the particular measures included in
FISCCA compared to the many variants of these measures that have
been proposed and that will continue to surface as Congress addresses
bank regulatory reform.
A. Expansion of Business Strategies Available to Banking
Organizations
As discussed in Part III, the profitability of traditional banking serv-
ices has declined as a result of competition from other types of financial
institutions. Regulatory restrictions on the services a banking organiza-
tion may perform, and the locations in which a bank may operate, limit
the nontraditional business strategies available to banking organizations,
144. In addition to reforming deposit insurance and allowing banking organizations to offer non-
banking financial services, FISCCA would: Allow commercial and industrial firms to own banks,
FISCCA §§ 203, 204; reorganize regulatory responsibilities among the FDIC and other bank, sav-
ings and loan, and credit union regulatory agencies, id. §§ 301-361; and provide for additional fi-
nancing of the FDIC, id. §§ 401-412. This article does not address those reforms.
I have been asked by the editors of this symposium to include in this part a fairly detailed descrip-
tion of FISCCA. Readers with only a general interest in bank reform may want to skim this part,
focusing on the first part of each subsection, in which I attempt to relate provisions of FISCCA to
the preceding theoretical discussion. For a more detailed description of FISCCA, see Muckenfuss,
Eager, & Nielsen, The Treasury Department Report: Modernizing the Financial System - Recom-
mendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks, BANK MANAGEMENT, Apr. 1991, at 12 or GIBSON,
DUNN & CRUTCHER, ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SAFETY AND CONSUMER
CHOICE ACT OF 1991 (Report by the Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Financial Institutions Group,
Washington, D.C., 1991).
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
742 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
and impair the efficiency with which banks provide traditional banking
services. As a result, banking organizations are unable to compete effec-
tively in traditional banking markets, and they are impeded from ex-
panding beyond those markets.
L Expansion of Services Banking Organizations May Provide
Many banking organizations have responded to the erosion of banks'
traditional loan markets by mounting aggressive business and litigation
strategies to test the limits of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act and to expand their activities as far as those limits
permit. In the last ten years, banking organizations have obtained regu-
latory approval for a wide range of nonbanking services, including, for
example, the securitization of loans,14 securities brokerage, 46 commer-
cial paper sales,147 merger and acquisition advice, 148 and, subject to vol-
ume limits, corporate equity and debt underwriting.' 49  Legal
restrictions, however, continue to constrain banks' performance of these
services.150 The saga of Bankers Trust obtaining approval to underwrite
commercial paper, its innovation to minimize the competitive disadvan-
tage created by Glass-Steagall Act and Bank Holding Company Act re-
strictions, and the remaining competitive disadvantage that Bankers
Trust and other banks continue to suffer in the commercial paper mar-
ket, provides an example of this process.' 5'
Legal restrictions on banks' ability to expand into nonbanking finan-
145. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989) cert. den. 110 S. Ct. 1113
(1990) (Security Pacific).
146. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207 (1984) (Charles Schwab & Co.)
(discount brokerage in affiliate); Securities Indus. Assn v. Comptroller of the Currency, 758 F.2d 739
(D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S.
388 (1987) (Security Pacific) (discount brokerage in bank); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Gov-
ernors, 821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987) cert. den. 484 U.S. 1005 (NatWest) (full service brokerage).
147. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. den.,
483 U.S. 1005 (1987) (Bankers Trust).
148. See, eg., The Fuji Bank Limited, 75 FED. RESERVE BULL. 577 (1989); Signet Banking
Corporation, 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 59 (1987); Security Pacific Corp., 71 FED. RESERVE BULL.
118 (1985).
149. J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc, The Chase Manhattan Corp., Bankers Trust New York Corp, Cit.
icorp and Security Pacific Corp., 75 FED. RESERVE BULL. 192 (1989). These services may be pro-
vided in a "Section 20" affiliate of a bank. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
151. See Litt, Macey, Miller & Rubin, Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets: Bank
Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States and Japan, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 369,
383-94 (1990) (recounting Bankers Trust's efforts and the current status of banks' involvement in the
commercial paper market).
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cial services have constrained banks from adopting business strategies
that banks appear well positioned to pursue.152 There is substantial rea-
son to expect that economies of scope exist among banking services and
other financial services, such as securities underwriting and insurance un-
derwriting and sales. These potential economies include the multiple use
of computer systems, marketing programs, and customer relationships,
plus economies of convenience to bank customers.' 53
Furthermore, activity restrictions constrain banking organizations
from adopting business strategies that could reduce their risk." 4 One
study has estimated that, on average, if banks had provided a diversified
set of financial services during the 1965 to 1982 period, they could have
reduced their risk by twenty-seven percent without affecting their profit-
ability."' Earlier studies similarly found that diversification of services
could reduce bank risk without sacrificing profitability. These studies
specifically found that fire and casualty insurance underwriting, invest-
ment banking, and insurance agency services, among other activities, are
elements of an efficient portfolio of financial services that a bank uncon-
strained by regulation would provide.'5 6
152 R. LITAN, supra note 112, at 74-81 (economies of scope).
153. See id. (analyzing potential economies); Kane, Technological and Regulatory Forces in the
Developing Fusion of Financial-Services Competition, 39 J. FIN. 759 (1984) (analyzing the interaction
between economies of scope and mispriced deposit insurance); Benston, Berger, Hanweck &
Humphrey, Economies of Scale and Scope in Banking, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON
BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 432 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1983).
Many of the services that banks perform involve the same skills and organization that securities
underwriters perform. Most fundamentally, both banking and securities underwriting involve credit
assessment. In addition, syndicated bank loans involve the use of distribution channels that are
similar in structure to those used by underwriting syndicates. And to the extent that some banks are
already involved in limited underwriting and other securities activities permissible under current
law, there are even greater economies. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at XVIII-14.
Similarly, banking services employ some of the same resources as insurance services. Whereas a
bank takes in deposits, invests them, and makes payments to depositors and their payees, an insurer
takes in premiums, invests them, and makes payments to insureds and their beneficiaries.
154. Ordinarily, shareholders' ability to diversify their own portfolios eliminates any need for
concern over diversification within a firm. The assessment of risk-related premiums that do not
distinguish between systematic and unsystematic risk, however, would make diversification at the
firm level a substantial concern. If banking organizations could not diversify and their nonbank
competitors could, banking organizations would suffer a competitive disadvantage. Furthermore, to
the extent that the deposit insurance system fails to internalize risk, there would be social benefits
from diversification. None of this is to say that banking organizations should be forced to diversify
or that they necessarily would do so if permitted. Some may choose instead to specialize and forgo
the benefits of diversification in favor of the efficiency they perceive in specialization.
155. R. LITAN, supra note 112, at 91.
156. Eisemann, Diversification and the Congeneric Bank Holding Company, 7 J. BANK RES. 68
(1976); Wall & Eisenbeis, Bank Holding Company Non-Banking Activities and Risk, in PROCEED-
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FISCCA would allow banking organizations that meet a specified set
of heightened capital standards to engage in an expanded range of finan-
cial and nonfinancial services. In order to limit the incidence of any de-
posit insurance subsidy that may remain despite the deposit-insurance
reforms discussed below, and in order to shield the FDIC from nonbank-
ing risk, FISCCA provides for a new holding company structure under
which most nonbanking activities would be carried out in affiliates of the
bank. The proposed structure involves two separate holding companies:
a "financial services holding company" (FSHC) and a "diversified hold-
ing company" (DHC), which would replace the current bank holding
company structure.1 57 The FSHC, which would hold the bank and the
affiliates engaged in nonbanking financial service activities, would be per-
mitted to engage in any activity that its federal regulator51 determines to
INGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 340 (Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, 1984); Heggestad, Riskiness of Investments in Nonbank Activities by Bank Holding Compa-
nies, 27 J. ECON. & Bus. 219 (1975); Johnson & Meinster, Bank Holding Company Diversification
and the Risk of Capital Impairment, I EAST. ECON. J. 316 (1974). See also Saunders, Bank Safety
and Soundness and the Risks of Corporate Securities Activities in DEREGULATING WALL STREET,
supra note 15, at 171, 175-78 (summarizing these studies).
It is often suggested that securities underwriting and other financial service businesses are riskier
than banking and that bank involvement in those activities would result in increased risk. In fact,
however, the studies cited above indicate that banking is among the riskier financial services busi-
nesses. Moreover, ifa banker wants to take high risk, there are ample opportunities within the areas
of activity permitted for banks. See Scott, Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: The Policy
Choices, 44 Bus. LAW. 907, 912 (1989) ("a bank can establish approximately the asset risk level that
it desires").
157. Under FISCCA, the expanded financial services - referred to as "new financial activities"
in the bill - could be provided only by a "Zone 1 FSHC" or an FSHC each of whose banks has
capital above the mean of the range of capital prescribed for "Zone 2" banks and that is making
"substantial progress" toward Zone I status. A Zone 1 FSHC is defined as an FSHC with 80% of its
insured depository institutions' assets held by banks within Zone 1 and the balance of its depository
institutions in Zone 2. A Zone 1 bank is a bank that (a) maintains risk-based capital significantly in
excess of the required minimum and Tier 1 capital significantly in excess of the required minimum,
or (b) meets the required minimum risk-based capital ratio and maintains a Tier 1 capital leverage
ratio that is substantially above the minimum. In addition, a Zone 1 bank must at least meet any
other applicable capital requirement that its regulator may establish. A Zone 2 bank must meet or
exceed all applicable capital requirements. FISCCA §§ 201-203, 25 l(a). See supra note 67 (current
capital requirements).
A bank holding company that, prior to January 1, 1993, engages in nonbanking activities permit-
ted by the Federal Reserve Board under current law could continue to engage in those activities even
if it is not a Zone 1 FSHC. Id. § 203(a)(3)(A).
158. The FSHC's regulator would be the agency with jurisdiction over its bank. FISCCA would
reallocate regulatory authority between the Federal Reserve Board and a newly created Office of
Depository Institutions Supervision (ODIS). The Federal Reserve Board would be responsible for
regulating state banks and their holding companies, and the ODIS would be responsible for regulat-
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be "of a financial nature,"' 59 including all those activities that the Fed-
eral Reserve Board has previously determined to be permissible for bank
holding companies under the current "closely related to banking" stan-
dard."r The DHC could be any commercial or industrial firm and could
own a bank only through an FSHC.16t
FISCCA authorizes FSHCs to engage in a broad range of securities
activities through securities affiliates. These activities include underwrit-
ing, distributing, brokering, and dealing in securities, operating mutual
funds, and any other activity permitted for registered securities brokers,
dealers, or investment advisors.' 62 Within periods of time specified in
FISCCA, a bank that is part of an FSHC would have to shift many of its
current securities activities out of the bank itself and into a securities
affiliate. 163
In addition, FISCCA provides that an FSHC subsidiary would be per-
mitted to serve as an insurance underwriter, broker, or agent. All insur-
ance underwriting would have to be performed in a subsidiary of the
FSHC and not in either the bank or a subsidiary of the bank. Insurance
ing national banks and savings associations as well as their holding companies. The ODIS would
also regulate credit unions. FISCCA, Title III.
159. FISCCA § 203(a)(3)(A). Real estate investment, management and development, and the
purchase and sale of real estate as principal or broker are explicitly deemed not to be "of a financial
nature." FSHCs, therefore, would not be permitted to engage in such activities. Id.
160. The "financial nature" standard would replace the familiar provision of the Bank Holding
Company Act that allows bank holding companies to engage in activities that are "so closely related
to banking ... as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
161. FISCCA §§ 202, 204. By allowing DHCs to engage in any type of business, including
commercial and industrial businesses, FISCCA would eliminate the separation between banking and
commerce, which has existed by law since the Bank Holding Company Act was enacted in 1956.
FISCCA would allow a commercial or industrial firm to acquire an FSHC and thereby become a
DHC only if its FSHC would be a Zone I FSHC following the proposed transaction. See supra note
157. In addition, FISCCA would give each banking agency the authority to disapprove an acquisi-
tion of an FSHC by a DHC if the agency determines that the depository institution involved in the
acquisition is engaged in unsafe or unsound practices or would be in an unsafe or unsound condition
following the acquisition. FISCCA § 202.
162. FISCCA § 203(a)(3XC).
163. FISCCA would require the conversion of section 20 subsidiaries into FSHC securities affili-
ates within three years of enactment of FISCCA. If an FSHC does not meet the capital standards
for new activities, it would be required to divest the section 20 subsidiary. In order to continue to
engage in those activities, a holding company would have to become a Zone 1 FSHC. Id.
§ 203(a)(3)(A). In addition, beginning one year after enactment, any bank that acquires a securities
affiliate would have to transfer all securities activities out of the bank and any other affiliate into the
securities affiliate. Securities activities "specifically authorized" for national banks by statute, regula-
tion, order, or interpretation promulgated prior to the enactment of FISCCA would not be subject to
this mandatory transfer. Id. § 203(a)(3)(C).
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agency and brokerage activities, which are considered essentially riskless,
could be performed by national banks themselves only if the law of the
state in which the bank is located permits state-chartered banks to en-
gage in such activities. 164
A bank's federal regulator would have the authority to prescribe rec-
ord-keeping requirements, to request reports from, and to examine the
bank's FSHC, DHC, and any financial services affiliate. This authority
would be circumscribed, however, by a set of constraints intended to
limit the bank regulators' review to matters affecting the risk imposed on
the bank. Regarding all other aspects of its operation, a bank's affiliate
would be subject to the primary regulatory jurisdiction of the agency
with responsibility for the activities in which the affiliate is engaged. For
instance, a bank's securities affiliate would be regulated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission and an insurance affiliate would be regulated
by state insurance regulators.
In an attempt to strike an efficient balance between the integration of a
bank with its financial services affiliates and the insulation of the bank
from the risks assumed by its affiliates, FISCCA would tighten the rules
regarding bank transactions with affiliates and loosen the rules on the
joint marketing of banking and other financial services. FISCCA would
allow the services of a bank and those of an FSHC affiliate to be pack-
aged and sold together at a combined price that is lower than the sum of
the prices of each service, so long as each service is available sepa-
rately.16 In addition, FSHC affiliates would be permitted to market
services of the bank.166 In order to prevent confusion regarding the sta-
tus of an FSHC affiliate, FISCCA would require prominent disclosure to
customers that the affiliate is not an insured depository and that its secur-
ities or insurance products are not insured. 16
7
In order to protect an insured bank from the risks of its FSHC affili-
ates and to prevent FSHCs from transferring any deposit insurance sub-
164. Id. § 203(a)(3)(C). Otherwise, only national banks located in towns with populations under
5,000 would be permitted to sell insurance and they would be limited to selling to residents and
employees in the state in which the bank is located. Under current law, the Comptroller allows such
banks to sell insurance to customers anywhere. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7100 (1991). For banks that are not
subsidiaries of FSHCs, FISCCA would not disturb the limited insurance agency powers available
under current law.
165. FISCCA § 212(b).
166. FISCCA would preempt any state law that would have the "purpose or effect of preventing
or impeding" such joint marketing. Id. § 206.
167. Id. § 203(a)(4).
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sidy that may exist to nonbank affiliates, FISCCA would retain and
strengthen sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, which are
the principal "firewalls" between a bank and its affiliates. 168 These provi-
sions apply collateral requirements and volume limitations to transac-
tions between a bank and its affiliates 69 and require that such
transactions be on arm's length terms.17° FISCCA would extend the ap-
plication of these provisions to investment companies and commodity
pools for which an FSHC affiliate is an advisor. 7 ' It would also require
a bank to provide five days advance notice to its regulator for transac-
tions with affiliates above a specified size.1 12 Additionally, it would apply
the restrictions to transactions with customers of FSHC affiliates, unless
such transactions are made on the same terms and according to the same
procedures that apply to true third-party transactions and so long as the
transaction is not intended to evade any of the affiliate transaction
provisions.17 3
Without more, the expansion of activities in which a banking organiza-
tion may engage would not reduce the likelihood that the bank would
fail. In order to have the risk-reducing effects of diversification accrue to
the benefit of the bank-and therefore the FDIC-there must be a mech-
anism by which losses in the bank can be recouped from the gains of
nonbank affiliates. One such mechanism is the self-interest of the share-
holders and managers of the FSHC or DHC of a bank that becomes
weak. Because the failure of an affiliated bank could well damage the
reputation of the bank's affiliates, a holding company may come to the
rescue of its failing bank.
FISCCA would supplement this incentive by requiring that an FSHC
and a DHC replenish the capital of a subsidiary bank when its capital
falls below a specified level.'" 4 When such a drop occurs, the FSHC
168. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
169. Id. § 371c.
170. Id. § 371c-1.
171. FISCCA § 223(a)(2).
172. Id. § 223(a)(1)(ii). This requirement would apply to transactions "exceed[ing] 5 per cen-
turn of the capital stock and surplus of the insured depository institution." Id.
FISCCA would also expand the range of transactions to which these restrictions apply. The
transactions added would include the following: (a) a bank's assumption of a liability of an affiliate;
(b) any transaction to enhance the marketability of securities underwritten or distributed by an affili-
ate; and (c) any transaction that the Federal Reserve Board determines to be "substantially
equivalent" to a covered transaction. Id. § 223(a)(5).
173. Id. §§ 223(b)(1) and (3).
174. That level would be the ZONE I level. See supra note 157.
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would be required either to restore the bank's capital or to post a bond
sufficient to bring the bank back to that level. That bond would be paya-
ble to the FDIC in the event of a failure. If the bank's capital is not
restored, the FSHC would be required either to divest the bank or to
terminate any new financial activity provided for under FISCCA. If the
FSHC fails to comply with these requirements, its DHC (if it has one)
would be required to divest its interest in the FSHC or terminate its non-
financial activities. 175 Consequently, a bank would either reap the bene-
fits of the diversification provided for by FISCCA, or it would be
divested ideally in time for it to be reorganized or otherwise put on a safe
and sound footing.
2. Geographic Expansion
Banks have responded to the changes in the financial services market
by expanding geographically within the limits established by current law.
This expansion has taken the form of intrastate branching and interstate
holding company acquisition. Interstate branching, however, is not per-
mitted under current law.
Interstate operation through holding company subsidiaries is generally
considered less efficient than the operation of an interstate branch net-
work within a single bank.1 76 Under an interstate branch structure, the
bank would have a single board of directors, management structure, and
computer system. It would also undergo integrated supervisory exami-
nations and audits and file integrated regulatory reports. Finally, it
would be subject to a single set of capital requirements for its entire oper-
ation.1 77 With separate bank affiliates in different states, each affiliate
must have a separate board of directors and management structure, and
each must comply with regulatory requirements separately. This multi-
plication of effort increases costs.
178
175. FISCCA § 251(a). These obligations would be triggered by a drop in bank capital below
the Zone 1 level and the obligation would be to restore capital to the Zone 1 level. See supra note
157.
176. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at XVII-12 (possible efficiencies to holding company
expansion).
177. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at XVII-1Oll.
178. Recent studies estimate substantial savings from integrating holding company affiliates into
branch networks. See Core Bank Proposal: Hearings on H.R. 6 Before the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (statement of Lowell L. Bryan, McKinsey & Co.,
Inc.) (1991); L. Bryan, J. Linder & D. Crane, Bank Mergers: Integration and Profitability (Harvard
Business School Working Paper No. 91-038, 1991). See also C. Glassman, INTERSTATE BRANCH-
ING - THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 2-3 (concluding with no new empirical work that interstate
[Vol. 69:695
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/4
1991] ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BANK REFORM 749
By increasing the cost of geographic expansion, branching restrictions,
like product restrictions, limit the range of profitable business strategies
available to banks. Strategies that involve the exploitation of economies
of scale by expanding regionally or nationally are less attractive as a re-
sult of these restrictions. 179 Moreover, geographic restrictions increase
the riskiness of a bank. Under the current regulatory regime, a portion
of the extra risk is borne by the FDIC. Under a reformed deposit insur-
ance system in which banks internalize the cost of their own risk, these
restrictions would increase banks' cost and hence decrease the profitabil-
ity of a poorly diversified bank.
FISCCA would substantially reduce the legal impediments to geo-
graphic expansion. It would repeal the Douglas Amendment, thereby
allowing bank holding companies to acquire banks across all state lines,
beginning three years after enactment.180 In addition, FISCCA would
amend the McFadden Act to allow national banks and out-of-state state-
chartered banks to branch into any state in which a bank holding com-
pany could acquire a bank.' I  Subject to the limits on intrastate branch-
ing discussed below, existing holding companies would be permitted to
consolidate their banks into branch networks.18 2
branching would increase efficiency). But see Klinkerman, Wider Branching Welcomed but Seen as
No Quick Fix, Am. Banker, March 8, 1991, at 1, col. 3 (although most bankers view branching as
more efficient, Banc One Corp. (Columbus, Ohio) believes the use of separate banks improves em-
ployee performance and community acceptance).
179. Economists have attempted to measure economies of scale in banking. See, eg., Benston,
Hanweck & Humphrey, Scale Economies in Banking: A Restructuring and Reassessment, 14 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 435 (1982). These studies generally find minimal economies of scale.
Nonetheless, large banks flourish in a variety of banking markets. See Miller, supra note 40, at 196-
98. Economies of scale could be dependent on the type of business in which a banking organization
engages. Some banks may adopt strategies that offer economies of scale while others adopt strategies
that do not. In addition, whatever economies may have existed in the past, technological develop-
ments could alter those economies in either direction. The objective of reform is to allow a bank to
determine for itself the extent to which economies of scale can be achieved in the areas in which it
does business.
180. FISCCA § 261(a). Under this provision, state law would be preempted to the extent that it
restricts an acquisition by an out-of-state bank holding company (under the new FISCCA nomencla-
ture, an FSHC or a DHC) based on the location or size of the holding company, its subsidiaries, or
any factor that would have a discriminatory effect on out-of-state holding companies. A parallel
provision, which would achieve the same effect for savings and loan holding companies, would go
into effect immediately upon enactment. Id. § 266. Under current law, savings and loan holding
companies are subject to a restriction generally similar to the Douglas Amendment, except that
acquisitions of weak or failed savings associations may be made regardless of state law restrictions.
12 U.S.C. § 1467a(e)(3) (Supp. 1 1989); id § 1823(k).
181. FISCCA §§ 262, 264.
182. Id. § 263.
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These provisions would allow immediate branching among states that
currently allow out-of-state holding company acquisitions, and unlimited
interstate branching in three years following enactment, when the repeal
of the Douglas Amendment would become effective. Although FISCCA
would still allow a state to prohibit its own state-chartered banks from
engaging in interstate branching, competitive pressure from national
banks and out-of-state state-chartered banks would probably prevent
states from retaining or enacting this type of restriction.
In deference to traditional federalism concerns in this area of the law,
FISCCA would leave the McFadden Act untouched to the extent that it
relates to intrastate branching. Thus, intrastate branching by national
banks still would be governed by the rules each state applies to its own
state-chartered banks, which, as stated above, have become generally
permissive in recent years.' 83
In sum, consistent with the regulatory ideal discussed in Part IV,
FISCCA's reforms in the areas of activity and geographic restrictions are
designed to expand the range of business strategies available to banks and
their affiliates. By allowing banking organizations to exploit economies
of scale and scope, these reforms would improve efficiency and enhance
the ability of banking organizations to compete with other financial insti-
tutions in traditional banking markets. Moreover, they would allow
banks to redeploy resources out of banking markets with excess capacity
and into other financial services markets. Finally, the business strategies
that would be made available by FISCCA include strategies that involve
the diversification of assets and services, which should allow banks that
pursue these strategies to reduce their risk below current levels.
FISCCA falls short of the ideal in these areas, however, by allowing
states to restrict intrastate branching and banks' insurance agency activi-
ties. In addition, there is no way of knowing in advance how well
FISOCA's holding company structure strikes the balance between inte-
grating banks with their affiliates to achieve efficiencies while segregating
them to avoid the transfer of risk and the deposit insurance subsidy.
B. Reduction of the Deposit Insurance Subsidy
FISCCA would establish several mechanisms that would reduce the
183. The Treasury Report recognizes, however, that "state laws restricting intrastate branching
are inefficient and anticompetitive." TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at 52.
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subsidy that deposit insurance provides to risky banks. It would do so by
forcing banks to internalize a greater portion of the cost of their own
risk-taking behavior. In insurance terms, these mechanisms include a
higher deductible, more coinsurance, stricter limits on FDIC liability,
risk-based premiums, stricter conditions of coverage, and better FDIC
access to information regarding bank riskiness. In addition, FISCCA en-
hances the bank regulator's ability to conserve the assets of a failing bank
by allowing the regulator to intervene and potentially close a bank before
the bank becomes insolvent.
L Higher Deductible-Higher Going Concern Value
Commentators have blamed low capital for the excessive riskiness of
banks in the 1980s, and have suggested that capital requirements be in-
creased in order to reduce risk-taking."8 4 As discussed in Part I, a bank's
capital serves as a restraint on moral hazard and a cushion for FDIC
losses in the same way that a deductible performs these functions in a
typical insurance relationship. When a bank fails, the shareholders lose
the value of their equity, just as an insured in any other context loses his
or her deductible if an insured-against event occurs. Higher capital thus
increases a bank's cost of failure. The argument in favor of higher capital
requirements is based on the plausible assumption that the more a bank's
shareholders have to lose in the event of a failure, the less they will take
risks that could lead to failure.'8 5
Consistent with that analysis, FISCCA would raise banks' deductibles,
but not by increasing bank capital requirements.186 Instead, the reduc-
tion of the geographic and service restrictions would have the effect of
increasing the aggregate profitability of banking organizations. As dis-
cussed in the context of the pre-1980 banking market, increased profit-
ability increases a bank's franchise value, which in turn increases the loss
a bank will suffer if it fails. The forfeiture of a bank's franchise value
upon failure, like the loss of capital, is analogous to the loss of a deducti-
184. See, e.g., Benston & Kaufman, Regulating Bank Safety and Performance in RESTRUCTUR-
ING BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA 63, 85-89 (W. Harat & R. Kushmeider, eds.
1988)
185. See Furlong & Keeley, supra note 105 (modeling this effect).
186. As a reason for refraining from increasing capital requirements, the Treasury Report cites
the possibility that increased capital requirements would lead to the shrinkage of bank lending,
which could leave certain borrowers without properly priced credit. The Treasury Report rejects
other arguments against increasing capital requirements. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at II-
11-17.
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ble in the ordinary insurance context. 187  The possibility of losing
franchise value, therefore, would increase the prospective cost of high-
risk strategies.
Because FISCCA would not accord banks protection from competi-
tion, there is no reason to expect (or to desire) that banks would gener-
ally earn supracompetitive returns under the proposed regulatory regime.
Therefore, banks that are currently earning returns below the competi-
tive leve 188 would be the ones that experience the increased deductible as
a result of FISCCA.
Although most of FISCCA's reforms of activity restrictions would ap-
ply only to the holding companies of banks whose capital meets or ex-
ceeds current capital requirements, the increase in franchise value
attributable to the opportunity to provide additional services would theo-
retically accrue not only to banking organizations that can expand their
services immediately, but also to any banking organization with a fore-
seeable prospect of doing so. Such a prospect would include the possibil-
ity of increasing capital by retaining earnings, raising equity from current
shareholders, raising equity from new investors, merging with another
bank, or being acquired by a new holding company (either an FSHC or a
DHC). A bank with insufficient capital to allow an affiliate immediately
to avail itself of the expanded powers would theoretically experience an
increase in its franchise value in an amount equal to the present value of
the additional profits to be earned by virtue of the expanded powers mul-
tiplied by the probability that the bank will meet those capital
requirements. 189
2. Risk-Related Premiums
Typically, an insurer charges premiums based on an estimate of the
expected value of the insurance payments that an insured's activity en-
tails. A car driver who has a history of reckless driving, for example, will
187. The loss of franchise value could also be characterized as a form of coinsurance. Its effect
on incentives, of course, does not depend on the characterization.
188. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
189. FISCCA includes other benefits dependent upon a bank's capital level. These include the
right to open new branches and to engage in new activities without regulatory approval, and the
right to acquire or merge with another bank subject to an approval process that is more circum-
scribed than the process for banks with lower capital. FISCCA § 25 1(a). This freedom from regula-
tory approval processes would theoretically be reflected in a bank's franchise value as well.
FISCCA also provides for regulatory sanctions for banks whose capital is below certain thresh-
olds. See infra notes 220-237 and accompanying text.
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pay more for insurance than a driver with a perfect safety record. By
paying premiums based on expected losses, the insured internalizes at
least a portion of the prospective cost of his or her activities. Accord-
ingly, the insurer receives adequate funding of future losses, and insureds
are induced to take the potential losses into account when evaluating
risky activities.
FISCCA would replace the current flat-rate premium with a system of
risk-related premiums. Premiums would be based on a bank's level of
capital, plus any other factors that the FDIC deems appropriate, includ-
ing the activities in which a bank is engaged and the nature of a bank's
assets and liabilities.t " In recognition of the limitations facing the FDIC
in attempting to price risk,19 1 FISCCA also directs the FDIC to study
the possibility of having private entities insure a portion of the risk of
bank failure. Under this proposal, private insurers would insure a pro
rata share of the risk of bank failure along with the FDIC.192 They
would price their insurance at market rates, and the FDIC would take
into account their premiums in setting its own premiums. 193
3. Coinsurance-Reduced Scope of Deposit Insurance
In a typical insurance relationship, the insurer pays for less than 100%
of the insured's marginal losses. For instance, after subtracting a deduct-
ible, the insurer might pay for eighty percent of the insured's losses up to
a maximum limit. The twenty percent of the losses that the insured bears
is referred to as coinsurance. Like deductibles and risk-related premi-
ums, coinsurance is designed to reduce moral hazard by forcing the in-
sured to pay for increases in risk. In making decisions regarding risk, the
insured will take into account the possibility of bearing a fixed fraction of
the cost of his or her actions.
The risk-restraining effect of coinsurance exists only to the extent that
190. FISCCA § 104(b).
191. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Wil-
laim R. Watson, Director of the Division of Research and Statistics of the FDIC, cited the lack of
competition in the FDIC's pricing of risk and the inherent difficulty of assessing the riskiness of bank
loans as impediments to the development of a risk-related premium system that relies entirely on
FDIC pricing. Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premiums, 1991. Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking. Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (199 1)(statement of William R. Wat-
sonXas yet unpublished).
192. Such a system has been proposed in a bill introduced in the Senate by Senator Dixon.
Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 1991, S. 261, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. S1160-70
(daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991).
193. FISCCA § 116.
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the insured does not expect to be insolvent at the time of an insured-
against event. If the insured knows he or she will be insolvent, and there-
fore unable to bear a share of the loss, the deterrent effect of coinsurance
is lost. Because deposit insurance is paid only when the insured bank is
insolvent, the bank cannot be made to pay a portion of the insured depos-
itors' losses. 194
The limits of deposit insurance coverage, however, may function in a
manner similar to coinsurance. By leaving some depositors uninsured,
banks may be forced to pay for the risk their activities impose on those
depositors left unprotected. If, as some studies suggest, 195 these deposi-
tors demand higher interest rates to reflect the risk that they will lose
their deposits in a bank failure, those risk premiums would function in a
manner similar to coinsurance. Instead of the bank, however, the unin-
sured depositors are the coinsurers, and they charge the bank risk-related
premiums for the risk they bear.196
In recognition of this principle, FISCCA would reduce the scope of
deposit insurance, potentially increasing the percentage of uninsured de-
posits in the banking system. FISCCA would thus eliminate pass-
through coverage for most pension plans.1 9 7 In addition, rather than al-
lowing a depositor to gain multiple $100,000 coverage limits by holding
several accounts in different "capacities" within a single institution,
FISCCA would combine a depositor's individual, joint and trust ac-
counts in applying the $100,000 limit.1 98 However, FISCCA would con-
tinue to allow depositors to gain multiple coverage by opening accounts
194. One can imagine, however, a system in which the bank's shareholders pay the amount of
the coinsurance out of their personal funds. Along these lines, prior to the 1930s, some states held
bank shareholders liable for losses to depositors to the extent of twice the value of their equity in the
bank.
195. See Gilbert, supra note 132, at 12-17 (reviewing empirical studies of market discipline);
Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical
Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 233-36 (1988) (arguing that empirical evidence supports the
effectiveness of depositor discipline).
196. The payment of risk-related interest rates on uninsured deposits may also be viewed as
analogous to a risk-related insurance premium.
197. FISCCA would eliminate pass-through coverage for the accounts of defined-benefit plans
(which are insured by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation), for defined-contribution plans
that are professionally managed, and for Bank Investment Contracts, or "BICs." FISCCA § 101(a).
198. Id § 101(b). This provision would become effective two years following enactment.
FISCCA would continue to allow an additional $100,000 of coverage for a retirement account. In
addition, the FDIC would have the authority to allow separate coverage for specific types of ac-
counts that it deems to warrant such coverage consistent with the objectives of protecting small
depositors and limiting expansion of deposit insurance coverage.
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in different banks. Thus, the revised $100,000 limit would reduce the
scope of coverage only by increasing a depositor's transaction cost of
making and maintaining multiple accounts of under $100,000. This re-
duction may well be minimal. The Treasury Report described a
$100,000 system-wide limit as an "appropriate long-term goal" but cited
administrative difficulties that prevent its immediate attainment.
FISCCA therefore directs the FDIC to spend eighteen months studying
the administrative feasibility of a system-wide $100,000 limit. 99
In addition, FISCCA would restrict the FDIC's authority to provide
de facto insurance by using failure resolution methods that protect unin-
sured depositors along with insured depositors. As discussed above, the
FDIC has protected uninsured depositors under two circumstances:
when it determines that a purchase and assumption transaction is less
costly than paying off insured depositors and liquidating a bank,2' and
when it determines that systemic financial damage would occur as a re-
sult of uninsured depositors suffering losses.2"' Under FISCCA, the
FDIC would be permitted to protect uninsured depositors through a
purchase and assumption transaction or any other resolution method
only when such a method is the least costly of all possible methods.2 "2
The Treasury Department expects that failed banks often can be resolved
at least cost by transferring insured deposits to an acquiring bank, leav-
ing uninsured depositors with claims against the failed bank's assets
along with those of other creditors, including the FDIC. To the extent
this is true, the requirement that the FDIC use the least-cost resolution
method would reduce, though not eliminate, the de facto protection that
uninsured depositors currently enjoy.
Under this type of transaction, termed an "insured-deposit transfer,"
only insured deposits are transferred to the acquiring bank along with the
failed bank's physical facilities and perhaps some of its other assets. The
FDIC contributes an amount of cash necessary to attract an acquiror.
Just as in a purchase and assumption transaction, however, the acquiror
typically pays an implicit premium for the failed bank's franchise
value.2o3
FISCCA further provides that the Federal Reserve Board and the
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
202. FISCCA § 103.
203. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
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Treasury Department, rather than the FDIC, would have discretion to
protect uninsured depositors in a too-big-to-fail situation. They could
provide such protection based on a joint finding that, in the absence of
protection, there would be a "severe adverse impact on the financial sys-
tem." 2" The cost of the protection, however, would be borne by the
FDIC with loans available to the FDIC to cover the cost of this
protection.20 5
In order to maintain the liquidity of uninsured deposits in either a
payoff and liquidation or an insured-deposit transfer, FISCCA would au-
thorize the FDIC to pay uninsured depositors an amount equal to the
face value of their deposits times a fraction equal the mean fraction of
bank liabilities that the FDIC has recovered in prior liquidations of failed
banks.206 That payment would be final, regardless of the recovery actu-
ally achieved in a particular liquidation. Thus, over time, uninsured de-
positors as a class would receive the amount they are due following the
liquidation of failed banks, but any particular depositor may receive
either more or less than the amount that would be received following the
liquidation of that depositor's own bank. Rather than waiting for a liqui-
dation to be complete, however, the uninsured depositors would immedi-
ately receive an amount equal to the statistically determined expected
value of their deposits.
The assumption underlying FISCCA's reduction in the scope of de-
posit insurance is that depositors can effectively discipline bank risk-tak-
ing. Substantial questions have been raised by commentators regarding
the effectiveness of depositor discipline, and the empirical evidence re-
garding this issue is ambiguous.2 "7 The riskiness of a bank is difficult to
ascertain and the incentive for any single depositor to monitor bank risk-
taking is plagued by collective action problems. The existence of a large
number of sophisticated depositors that are uninsured in name and in
204. FISCCA § 103(a). The Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board would be
required to consult with the FDIC and the OMB in making this determination.
In addition, FISCCA would alter banks' payment system obligations in a manner that would
reduce the likelihood that the failure of one bank would cause a chain reaction of failures as a result
of the failed bank's inability to fulfill payment obligations. Id. §§ 501-505.
205. Id. § 103.
206. Id. § 541.
207. See, eg., Gilbert, supra note 132, at 12-17 (concluding that empirical studies of market
discipline show mixed results); Garten, Still Banking on the Market: A Comment on the Failure of
Market Discipline, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 241 (1988) (questioning the effectiveness of depositor disci-
pline); Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON
REG. 129 (1986) (same).
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fact, however, could lead to expanded availability of private bank rating
entities that could reduce the likelihood of a run and facilitate depositors'
assessment of and response to bank risk-taking. Alternatively, markets
for private insurance could develop to cover uninsured deposits. It re-
mains to be seen whether these forms of market discipline can effectively
restrain risk-taking and whether scaled back insurance will reintroduce
the problem of bank runs.2 °8
Even without an improvement in market discipline, however, the re-
duction in the scope of deposit insurance could have a socially beneficial
effect on the allocation of credit. Rather than bear the risk of bank fail-
ure, some large depositors might shift funds out of the banking system
and into any of the various substitutes that now exist for bank accounts.
Although that would reduce the volume of credit that banks can provide,
current bank clients may well have other sources of credit available that
would replace bank credit once the deposit insurance subsidy is removed.
Furthermore, as a result of the deposit insurance subsidy, some bank
credit is currently being provided to projects that should not be financed
in the first place. One would therefore expect, and indeed desire, that the
removal of the deposit insurance subsidy would result in some shrinkage
of the banking industry as a proportion of the credit market.2° 9 For
those banks that expand their services into the mutual fund and securi-
208. Some commentators have proposed the use of subordinated debt as a means of internalizing
the cost of bank risk-taking. See, eg., G. BENSTON, R. EISENBEIS, P. HoRvrrz, E. KANE & G.
KAUFMAN, PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE & SOUND BANKING: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 315-16
(1986) [hereinafter SAFE & SOUND BANKING]; Scott, supra note 156, at 916; Wall, A Plan for Re-
ducing Future Deposit Insurance Losses Puttable Subordinated Debt, 74 ECONOMIC REVIEW, July-
Aug. 1989, at 2 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta). These proposals are based on the same principle
of market discipline and are intended to avoid the collective action problems that depositor disci-
pline entails. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-19-24 (discussing advantages and disad-
vantages of subordinated debt).
209. It is difficult to predict accurately the extent to which uninsured deposits, which now con-
stitute approximately 25% of total deposits, would be shifted out of the banking system. The possi-
bility and effect of a run by uninsured depositors contributes to this difficulty. In addition, it is
difficult to determine the extent to which credit markets now served by banks could be served effi-
ciently by other types of financial institutions. Since the late 1970s, banks have provided a decreas-
ing share of commercial credit, with the shares of commercial paper and finance company loans
increasing. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 42, at 164-65 (Chart S-2) (1991). I
am not aware of any research regarding how much more credit might be provided efficiently outside
the banking system or regarding the size of the markets that remain dependent on banks for credit.
This should be a high priority for future research. The riskiness of a bank is difficult to ascertain and
the incentive for any single depositor to monitor bank risk-taking is plagued by collective action
problems. Moreover, depositor discipline could take the form of a run, even on a solvent bank,
which would be an efficient form of discipline.
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ties areas, the transfer of funds out of the banking system would not
necessarily mean a transfer out of a given banking organization. It may
only mean a transfer of business to a securities or mutual fund affiliate.
4. Conditions of Coverage-Activity Limits
The insurance devices discussed above are designed to provide in-
sureds with monetary incentives to consider the downside potential of
activities that involve risk. The other general type of restraint on risk-
taking that commercial insurers employ is to restrict the activities in
which the insured may engage in order to obtain and retain insurance.
For instance, many life insurers do not sell insurance to people engaged
in certain high-risk occupations or hobbies. The current regulatory sys-
tem relies heavily on this type of curb on risk-taking. The restrictions on
the securities services a bank and its affiliates may provide, for example,
fall into this category of restraint. More generally, the bank regulatory
agencies' authority to supervise bank operations and to order banks to
cease and desist from engaging in any "unsafe or unsound practice" or
from maintaining any "unsafe or unsound condition" is intended to al-
low regulators to constrain bank risk-taking.
Although FISCCA would substantially reduce restrictions on the fi-
nancial services activities of banks' affiliates, it would enhance the au-
thority of federal bank regulators to prevent banks themselves from
engaging in risky activities. As discussed further below, any bank that
does not meet the capital requirements would be potentially subject to
growth limits, restrictions on distributions to shareholders, termination
of activities that create "excessive risk to the bank," dismissal of manage-
ment, and other measures.210 In addition, even if a bank meets the capi-
tal requirements, its federal regulator would be required to withhold
approval for any investment, expansion, or acquisition if the bank or any
affiliated bank is "engaged in an unsafe or unsound practice or is in an
unsafe or unsound condition." '211
FISCCA would also restrict the freedom of state bank regulators to
allow state-chartered banks to engage in activities that are not permissi-
ble for national banks. First, unless it meets the capital requirements and
receives approval from the FDIC, a state bank would not be permitted to
engage as a principal in any activity that is impermissible for a national
210. FISCCA § 251(a). See infra notes 220-237 and accompanying text.
211. FISCCA§251.
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bank.2 12 Second, a state bank could not make any equity investment that
is impermissible for a national bank.213 Third, any state or national
bank that fails to meet the capital requirements could be ordered to stop
engaging in any activity that, in the view of the federal bank regulator,
poses excessive risk to the bank.
FISCCA would also improve the regulators' ability to control bank
risk-taking by curtailing the use of insured deposit brokerage. Under
current law, a bank can obtain a high volume of insured funds in a short
amount of time through a deposit broker and invest those funds in risky
investments, thereby altering the bank's risk profile well before its next
examination. In order to remedy this situation, FISCCA would deny
insurance to deposits obtained through a broker. Without insured
brokered deposits, a bank could not as easily effect a rapid change in the
riskiness of its portfolio. Consequently, periodic bank examinations
would be more likely to uncover increases in risk while there is still time
for examiners to impose restraints.21 4
5. Limits of Liability-Growth Restrictions
A typical insurance contract provides that the insurer will cover in-
sured-against losses for a single insured up to a limit - often $300,000 or
$500,000 on automobile insurance, for example. Such provisions limit
the insurer's exposure and reduce moral hazard. The FDIC's obligation
is to provide full protection for all insured deposits that are lost in a bank
failure. Even if the $100,000 limit (or any other per-depositor limit) on
depositor protection were adhered to strictly, the addition of new depos-
its from existing customers whose account balances are below the limit
would increase the FDIC's potential loss in the event of a failure, as
would the addition of new depositors.2" 5 Direct limits on the extent to
which the FDIC will cover a bank's losses are therefore inconsistent with
212. To approve an activity, the FDIC would have to find that the activity "poses no significant
risk" to the deposit insurance fund. Id § 105(a).
213. Id.
214. Id. § 101. Brokered deposits are deposits that a bank receives through a broker, often a
securities firm, which can rapidly communicate the availability of an attractive interest rate to large
depositors nationwide. With a sufficiently attractive interest rate, a deposit broker can attract tens of
millions of dollars in deposits in a very short time. Although FISCCA would eliminate the broker-
age of insured deposits, it would not prevent a bank from soliciting its own deposits by nationally
advertising an attractive interest rate.
215. The conceptual limit on the FDIC's exposure discussed here should not be confused with
the $ 100,000 limit on the coverage of a depositor's funds. The concept discussed here is a limit on
the FDIC's liability in the event of a particular bank's failure.
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
760 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the concept of deposit insurance.216
A practice has developed, however, that has the same effect on FDIC
exposure and bank incentives as do coverage limits in other insurance
contexts. Under current law, the FDIC and the other bank regulatory
agencies have discretion to restrict the rate at which a weak bank may
accept additional deposits. This limitation fixes the FDIC's maximum
exposure at the bank's current level of deposits plus a permitted rate of
growth. 2
17
As discussed further below, FISCCA would increase the bank regula-
tors' use of this type of mechanism. If a bank's capital is below the mini-
mum requirements, the FDIC would have the authority to restrict the
rate at which the bank could increase its deposits. As part of a system of
calibrated regulatory responses to banks with low capital, a bank whose
capital is below a regulatory minimum could be prohibited from allowing
its deposits to grow or even be ordered to have them contract. Banks
with capital "significantly" below the minimums would be subject to
mandatory deposit-growth restrictions.218
6. The End-Game of the Insured Bank-Prompt Corrective Action
Deposit insurance differs from other types of insurance in that the
FDIC, in combination with the other bank regulators, has the power to
influence directly the magnitude of its own losses if an insured-against
event occurs. The source of this power lies in the role of the FDIC and
other bank regulators in timing the point at which a failing bank is
closed.2 19 If, for example, a bank were closed at a point at which its net
worth-measured by market value-were exactly zero, rather than nega-
tive, the FDIC would incur no losses (other than the administrative cost
of the closure). The FDIC would pay off depositors and recoup the cost
of those payments from the proceeds of the sale of the bank's assets.
Alternatively, the FDIC might find an acquiror that is willing to take
over the failed bank and assume all obligations to insured depositors with
no financial assistance from the FDIC. In a sense, one could thus view
deposit insurance as insurance, not against bank failure, but rather
216. One can imagine, however, a system in which a bank is allocated, or perhaps purchases, a
specified quantity of insurance-say, $500 million-to be allocated among depositors in whatever
manner the bank chooses. That would be a radical departure from the current system and, without
substantial refinement, would not meet the needs of the banking system.
217. See White, supra note 66, at 24.
218. FISCCA § 251(a). See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 57 (authority to close a bank or to terminate its insurance).
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against the possibility that the regulators will fail to close a bank before
its net worth, measured at market value, becomes negative.
In this respect, the position of the FDIC is similar to that of a creditor.
The FDIC has an obligation to insured depositors, but once a bank is
closed and the FDIC has fulfilled that obligation, it assumes the rights of
the depositors against the assets of the insolvent bank.220 Therefore, the
ability of the regulator to close a bank in a timely fashion is a significant
determinant of the FDIC's ultimate losses.
The timely closure of a bank is difficult because it requires accurate
information regarding not only the current solvency of a bank, but also
the rate at which its net worth may decline. It also requires decisive
action by the bank regulator. Timely closure is made particularly diffi-
cult because, as a bank approaches the point of insolvency, its incentive
to take risks increases, and increased risk-taking can cause the bank's
rate of decline to accelerate.221 It is therefore important for the FDIC
and the other bank regulators to have regulatory tools at their disposal
that allow them to restrict the risk-taking behavior of banks as they ap-
proach the insolvency point.
Under current law, regulators have a wide range of discretion to order
banks to cease and desist from engaging in unsafe or unsound prac-
tices.222 The procedures required for the exercise of this discretion, how-
ever, can be lengthy. In addition, the regulators may, at times, be more
lenient than they should be in exercising this discretion.223
FISCCA provides for increasingly stringent regulatory control as a
bank's capital falls below the regulatory minimum, coupled with expe-
dited administrative and judicial review procedures. Although the regu-
latory agencies would retain some discretion in applying sanctions, their
discretion would be constrained. FISCCA's system of controls, termed
"6prompt corrective action," is structured around a set of five "zones"
220. As some commentators have observed, deposit insurance in this respect is structured like a
loan "guarantee." See Kane, Appearance and Reality in Deposit Insurance: The Case for Reform, 10
J. BANKING & FIN. 175 (1986). Deposit insurance differs from a typical loan guarantee in that it
applies to a constantly changing set of obligations (deposits) backed by a constantly changing set of
assets (bank loans and other assets).
221. That is, its deductible declines to zero.
222. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b),(cXSupp. I 1989Xcease-and-desist actions for unsafe and unsound
practices).
223. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at 41, X-6-10; SAFE & SOUND BANKING, supra note
209, at 260-71, 309-10 (concluding that regulators fail to respond quickly to failing banks and sug-
gesting closure while bank capital is still positive).
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defined with reference to bank capital levels.2 24 Banks in Zone 1 and
Zone 2 have capital equal to or above the currently prescribed mini-
mum,225 and banks in Zones 3 through 5 have capital below the
minimum.2
26
Under the prompt corrective action scheme, a Zone 3 bank is defined
as a bank with capital below the regulatory minimums, but not "signifi-
cantly" below any either minimum. A Zone 4 bank is a bank with capi-
tal "significantly" below a regulatory minimum. Finally, a Zone 5 bank
is a bank with capital at or below a "critical" level, which is defined as "a
level of capital that will, as a general matter, permit resolution of an
insured bank's problems without significant financial loss to the
[FDIC]." The "critical" capital level is to be set by each bank regulator,
at a level at least equal to 1.5% of assets.22 7 In addition, each bank regu-
lator is given the authority to define a bank to be in Zone 3 or Zone 4
regardless of its capital level if it determines that the bank is in an unsafe
or unsound condition.228
A bank within Zone 3-that is, a bank with capital below a regulatory
minimum, but not "significantly" so-would be subject to a set of
"mandatory" sanctions. These sanctions include a requirement that the
bank submit to its regulator a feasible plan providing for the restoration
of its capital to a level sufficient to meet the regulatory minimums. In
addition, the bank would be prohibited from making any distribution to
shareholders that would cause the bank to fall below Zone 3, or to make
any other distribution without first obtaining a determination from its
federal regulator that the distribution furthers the bank's capital restora-
224. Capital levels are to be determined with reference to a bank's risk-based capital ratio and its
leverage ratio in relation to the required risk-based capital and leverage ratios provided for under
current law. See supra note 67. In addition, however, the regulatory agencies are given the author-
ity to "establish any additional relevant capital measure or measures that are consistent with the
purposes of [the prompt corrective action system]." FISCCA § 251(a).
225. The difference in treatment between Zone 1 banks and Zone 2 banks primarily involves the
availability of regulatory privileges rather than constraints. See supra note 157. Depending on one's
point of view, the withholding of a privilege can look very much like the imposition of a sanction.
Nonetheless the distinction is useful in describing regulatory control over banks approaching the
insolvency point.
226. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (describing capital requirements).
227. For purposes of this measure, only Tier 1 or "core" capital is to be included in the numera-
tor of the calculation. Tier 1 capital, which would continue to be defined as it is under current law,
includes common stockholders' equity, certain types of preferred stock, and minority interests in the
equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries, but excludes goodwill. See supra note 70 and accompa-
nying text (describing capital requirements).
228. FISCCA § 251(a).
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tion plan. Furthermore, if a Zone 3 bank is part of an FSHC or a
DHC,229 those holding companies would be required to maintain a net
worth equal to the shortfall of the bank's capital, and they would be
permitted to make distributions to shareholders only with the approval
of the bank's federal regulator. A regulator would be authorized to re-
frain from imposing any of these sanctions if it makes a determination in
writing that doing so is "in the public interest." Finally, a Zone 3 bank
would be subject to the following discretionary sanctions: limits on the
growth or mandated reduction of its assets or liabilities; requirements
that new equity be issued; restrictions on activities, including the termi-
nation of activities; dismissal of bank board members and executive of-
ficers; requirements that new directors be elected, including directors
specified by the regulator; and required divestiture or liquidation of
affiliates. 230
A bank within Zone 4-one with capital "significantly" below a regu-
latory minimum-would be subject to the same mandatory and discre-
tionary actions to which a Zone 3 bank is subject, plus additional
sanctions. Mandatory sanctions for a Zone 4 bank would include the
following: Prohibition on distributions to shareholders; prohibition on
the acquisition or establishment of an affiliated bank or a branch, or the
initiation of a new activity; asset growth restrictions; and prohibition on
any increase in executive officers' compensation. Again, a regulator
could refrain from imposing these sanctions only based upon a written
determination that doing so is "in the public interest." In addition, a
regulator would have the discretion to order a bank's holding company
to divest the bank if it determines that such divestiture would improve
the bank's financial condition or future prospects. Alternatively, it could
appoint a conservator for the bank.23
Finally, a bank within Zone 5 would be subject to a forced merger or
to the appointment of a receiver or conservator, which would generally
be the FDIC. The FDIC, as receiver or conservator, would have the
authority to take any action against the bank that can be taken against a
Zone 3 or Zone 4 bank. A Zone 5 bank could escape such a fate only if
its federal regulator and the FDIC agree that the public interest requires
leniency.232
229. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
230. FISCCA § 25 1(a). This list of mandatory and discretionary sanctions is not exhaustive.
231. Id. This list of mandatory and discretionary sanctions is not exhaustive.
232. Id.
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In order to allow the regulatory agencies to institute these "prompt
corrective action" measures in a timely fashion, FISCCA would limit
and expedite judicial review of agency actions. 233  Suits to set aside
agency actions would be subject to an arbitrary-and-capricious standard
of review and could be brought either in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit or the United States Court of
Appeals for the circuit in which the aggrieved bank maintains its home
office.234 The United States Claims Court would have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to award damages to parties that have succeeded in having an
agency action set aside.235 No court would have the authority to enjoin
an agency action pending judicial review, and the filing of a suit challeng-
ing an agency action would not operate as a stay of any such action.236
7 Access to Information-Market Value Reporting, Annual
Examinations, Access to Audit Reports
The ability of the bank regulators to monitor bank safety and to imple-
ment the measures described above depends upon the availability of ac-
curate and timely information regarding a bank's operations and
financial condition. Although there is evidence that the information reg-
ulators currently receive often allows them to identify troubled banks
between one and three years prior to their failure, better information
would allow them to do so more frequently and to close failing banks
earlier.2
37
One type of information that can be very useful to a bank regulator is
the market value of a bank's assets and liabilities. As discussed in Part I,
this information is not provided to regulators under current law. Regula-
tors instead rely on banks' balance sheets, which generally reflect the
historical values of assets and liabilities. FISCCA, therefore, would re-
quire banks to report to the bank regulatory agencies the estimated fair
market value of their assets and liabilities, to the extent feasible. Banks
233. Suits challenging agency actions would have to be filed within ten days after the plaintiff
receives notice of the action, and the Courts of Appeals would be directed to give these actions
expedited review.
234. Suits could be brought by any of the following parties: a company ordered to make a divest-
iture or to terminate activities; a bank or bank affiliate that is subject to mandatory or discretionary
sanctions or any company that controls such a bank or bank affiliate; and a director or officer who
has been dismissed or whose compensation has been limited by agency action.
235. Damages would be limited to "actual damages." FISCCA § 251(a).
236. IaM
237. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at X-2-5.
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would not be required to restate their balance sheets in market value
terms. Capital-upon which premium levels, the scope of permissible
activities, and other regulatory privileges would depend-would still be
measured by valuing assets and liabilities according to historical val-
ues.238 Hence, this reform would not go as far as the ideal suggested by
some commentators. 239 Nonetheless, with market value information in
hand, the bank regulators could employ their discretionary authority to
prevent unsafe or unsound practices or conditions and potentially to
achieve the same objectives that proponents of full-fledged market value
accounting seek.2"
In addition, FISCCA would require all banks to provide their regula-
tor with copies of any audit report, management letter, or other report
produced by an independent auditor. In order to discourage opinion
shopping, banks would also be required to notify their regulator of any
change in auditor.24'
Finally, FISCCA would improve the regulators' and the FDIC's ac-
cess to information by requiring annual on-site examinations for banks
with assets above $1 billion and allowing additional examinations if nec-
essary. Examinations could also be extended to bank affiliates to deter-
mine the effect they have on the bank. 242 As is true under current law, a
bank examiner would have the authority to mark down loan values on a
bank's balance sheet depending on his or her judgment regarding the
likelihood of repayment. With more frequent examinations, such revalu-
ations would improve the accuracy of a bank's reported capital and
238. FISCCA § 107(a).
239. See ag. White, supra note 66, at 19-20 (suggesting complete market value accounting).
240. Because most bank assets are not traded on an active market, their market values cannot be
obtained with any objectivity. According to the Treasury Report, the Treasury Department declined
to require complete market value accounting because the inherent subjectivity of this information
could lead to inaccuracy and would make comparisons among banks difficult. In addition, the
Treasury stated that the development of a comprehensive market value accounting system would be
expensive and would disproportionately burden small banks. Finally a system in which some assets
are measured at market value and others are measured at GAAP values could lead to biases in the
investment decisions of banks, including a bias against using certain techniques to hedge against
interest rate volatility. The Treasury Department suggested that, in the future, techniques may be
developed that allow more complete market value accounting. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at
43-4.
241. FISCCA § 107.
242. Id. §§ 106, 323. Banks with under $1 billion in assets and that are in compliance with the
capital requirements would be examined every eighteen months. There is now no statutory require-
ment regarding the frequency of examinations. See 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989). The
median frequency with which banks are currently examined is approximately one year. TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 3, at X-5 (fig. 3).
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thereby increase the effectiveness of the capital-based regulatory
measures.
Although these measures would improve the ability of bank regulators
to react to excessive risk-taking and to reduce the FDIC's losses from
bank failures, failures will surely occur nonetheless, and mistakes will be
made. Some banks will be able to conceal their true condition from the
regulators. Moreover, even a bank that has had an accurate examination
can fail before its next examination. Once banks begin to fail, their capi-
tal can fall very quickly. The better the information available to the reg-
ulators, however, the less frequently this will occur.243
& Summary of Deposit Insurance Subsidy Reforms
Although there is no way of knowing the extent to which FISCCA
would eliminate the deposit insurance subsidy, there is reason to believe
that it would reduce it substantially. The increased profitability expected
to occur as a result of FISCCA's liberalized activity restrictions would
have the effect of an increased deductible for a segment of the banking
industry. Risk-related premiums and the reduced availability of insured
deposits would force all banks, to some extent, to pay higher costs for
increases in risk (and to reduce their costs for reductions in risk).2 " Fur-
thermore, banks whose capital declines below the regulatory minimum
would become subject to strict regulatory control. In order to extract a
subsidy from the deposit insurance system, a bank would have to in-
crease its risk to a level high enough to offset the expected loss of its
capital plus its franchise value; it would have to do so in a manner that
does not trigger offsetting increases in either its deposit insurance premi-
ums or the interest rates it pays on uninsured deposits; and such an in-
crease in risk would have to escape the heightened attention of the bank's
regulator, whose discretion to refrain from imposing sanctions would be
more narrow than in the past.
FISCCA thus appears well designed to respond to the problems this
article has identified in the current regulatory system. The potentially
weak link in the system is continued reliance on governmental entities-
the FDIC and the other bank regulatory agencies-to monitor bank op-
erations, to assess risk, and to take actions based on those assessments.
243. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at X-2-5 (inherent difficulty of preventing failures
consistently).
244. For banks that experience an increased franchise value, the prospect of losing that value
will also represent a cost of increasing risk at the margin.
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FISCCA's risk-related premiums, the sanctions for FSHCs with inade-
quate bank capital, and the prompt corrective action system are only as
good as the regulators that administer them. In light of recent history,
concern on this score is not unwarranted. Nonetheless, other than radi-
cal proposals to deregulate or restructure the financial services sector,
which are politically infeasible and technically uncertain at this time, al-
ternative regulatory systems would be similarly reliant on bureaucratic
decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate irony of the current bank regulatory system is that a set
of rules designed to protect banks from what was perceived as unhealthy
competition now forces banks to compete in a clearly unhealthly environ-
ment. As economic forces have moved lending activity from the banking
markets to securities markets, regulation has generally prevented bank-
ing organizations from responding effectively. Banks therefore have re-
mained largely trapped in a shrinking market.
As a result of changes that have occured in the financial markets, bank
failures have accelerated, reaching a level in recent years that far exceeds
that of any period since the establishment of the current regulatory re-
gime in 1933. One would expect, however, that banks would fail as a
result of increased competition. In a system of competitive markets,
when demand for the products of an industry declines, the industry's
resources are reallocated to markets in which they are in greater demand.
This occurs through the failure and liquidation of some firms, and
through mergers, acquisitions, and internal expansion of others. The dis-
turbing aspects of the last decade of bank failures are, first, that they
appear to be the only means by which resources are reallocated out of the
banking markets, and second, that they have been the crowning conclu-
sion to bank risk-taking sprees that have been financed by the FDIC.
The result is that these losses are greater than they would have been if
the regulatory system had allowed market forces a freer rein.
Both the failure of excess resources to be withdrawn from the banking
market and the excessive risk-taking that seems to be occurring among
banks are attributable to a poorly conceived bank regulatory system. Re-
strictions on the services banking organizations may perform and the lo-
cations in which they may operate have impeded banks from achieving
efficiencies in providing banking services and from reallocating resources
to nonbanking markets through either internal expansion or mergers
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with nonbanking firms. At the same time, the deposit insurance system
has created an undesirable outlet for the competitive pressure created by
the entry of other financial institutions into banks' traditional markets.
By adopting high-risk business strategies that take advantage of a subsidy
available only to banks through the deposit insurance system, banking
organizations can continue to employ resources in banking markets that
would be better employed in other sections of the economy and can ex-
tend their presence in the banking business.
Bank regulatory reform must include three elements: It must allow
banking organizations to expand the services they provide; it must allow
banks to expand and merge across state lines; and it must eliminate the
deposit insurance subsidy. FISCCA achieves the first two objectives di-
rectly. Although the proposed holding company structure may require
further refinement, the general outlines of the proposal would allow ade-
quately capitalized banks to provide a full range of financial services and
thereby respond to market forces in allocating their resources among
banking and nonbanking markets. FISCCA would retain deposit insur-
ance, but it would introduce a set of measures designed to reduce the
deposit insurance subsidy by forcing banks to internalize the risks they
assume and by enhancing the ability of the FDIC and the other federal
regulators to control bank risk-taking. Only experience will tell whether
these measures will be effective. If they are not, the ultimate solution
may require significantly more radical changes to the banking system,
including the elimination of deposit insurance or the narrowing of its
scope to a small fraction of bank deposits.24
245. See, ag., R. LrrAN, supra note 112; L. BRYAN, RESTORING HEALTH AND PROFITABILITY
To THE U.S. BANKING STSTEM (McKinsey & Co., 1990).
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